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We provide an analysis of the 2008-2009 trade collapse using microdata from a small open 
economy, Belgium. First, we find that changes in firm-country-product exports and imports occurred 
mostly at the intensive margin: the number of firms, the average number of destination and origin 
markets per firm, and the average number of products per market changed only very little. Second, 
econometric analysis reveals some composition effects in the intensive margin fall along firm, 
product and country characteristics. The most important factor explaining changes in exports is the 
destination country's growth rate of GDP. Had growth rates in 2008-2009 been the same as in 
2007-2008, Belgian exports would have fallen by about 57% less than what we observe. Trade in 
consumer durables and capital goods fell more severely than trade in other product categories, 
which explains another 22% of the observed fall. Financial variables and involvement in global 
value chains have some explanatory power on the exports and imports fall respectively, but appear 
to have affected domestic operations in equal proportion. More generally, exports-to-turnover and 
imports-to-intermediates ratios at the firm level did neither systematically decrease nor reveal strong 
firm- or sector-specific patterns. Overall, our results point to a demand-side explanation: the fall in 
trade was mostly driven by the fall in economic activity. It is not a trade crisis -| just a trade collapse.  
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 1 Introduction
World trade in manufactures fell by about 30% in nominal terms between the rst quarter
of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009 (WTO, 2009). While some countries experienced
sharp sectoral drops in their exports or imports during the past, the current trade collapse
is remarkably wide-ranging across industries and highly synchronized across OECD countries
(Ara ujo and Martins, 2009). It also substantially exceeds the fall in world GDP. Though it
is well known that trade is generally more responsive than GDP to macroeconomic shocks,
even when accounting for the long-term increase in the income elasticity of trade (Freund,
2009), computable general equilibrium models and international real business cycle models
signicantly under-predict both the magnitude and the speed of the current collapse (e.g.,
Benassy-Qu er e et al., 2009; Levchenko et al., 2009).
Why was the fall in trade not commensurate with the recession? Many conjectures focus
on the supply side of trade: a dramatic trade credit crunch (Auboin, 2009; Chor and Manova,
2010); the widespread disruption of global value chains (Yi, 2009);1 or protectionism raising
its ugly head again (Evenett, 2009; Jacks et al., 2009). All these conjectures point at a trade
crisis | a crisis of the activity of trading across national boundaries per se. Alternatively,
other conjectures focus on the demand side of trade: a disproportionate fall in the demand
for tradable goods in most OECD countries (Eaton et al., 2010); or inventory adjustment
(Alessandria et al. 2010) and the postponement of durable goods purchases. In principle,
all these conjectures may play a role. Only empirical analysis can allow us to discriminate
between them.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a detailed microeconometric investiga-
tion of the determinants of the trade collapse for a small open economy: Belgium. Matching
Belgian data on the universe of rm-country-product exports and imports with balance sheet
information (and excluding entrepot trade) we perform three empirical exercises. First, we
decompose the trade collapse along the extensive and the intensive margins as in Bernard
et al. (2009). Intensive margin changes are dened as changes in average trade values per
rm-market-product, while the extensive margin refers to changes in the number of rms,
destinations and products. Second, we use our microdata to econometrically investigate the
determinants of the fall in trade in order to discriminate between the aforementioned conjec-
tures. More precisely, we look at variations in the changes in trade ows between the rst
semesters of 2008 and 2009 along rm, country, and product characteristics. In other words,
we identify the main drivers of the trade collapse through compositional eects. Finally,
we examine changes in exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates ratios across rms.
1As pointed out by Freund (2009), among others, a fall in nal demand in a world with fragmented produc-
tion chains should have a proportional impact on intermediate trade (disregarding input substitution or price
changes). Increasing fragmentation may explain the long-term rise of the trade elasticity with respect to GDP,
but not its short-term rise during macroeconomic crises. Evidence of the disruption of global value chains
during recessions is required to explain higher short-term trade elasticities. To the best of our knowledge such
evidence is missing to date.
1Compositional eects in changes in these ratios would oer crucial evidence pointing to the
main drivers of the `trade crisis'. To the best of our knowledge no other study has until has
analyzed the trade collapse using rm-level data on trade and domestic operations.
Our key ndings can be summarized as follows. First, we nd that virtually all of the
trade collapse occurred at the intensive margin. In other words, rm exit and the dropping
of products and markets played only a limited role relative to price adjustments and output
scaling in explaining changes in trade values. Furthermore, entry and exit dynamics during
the crisis were not substantially dierent from those observed in a `normal year'. This echoes
ndings by Bernard et al. (2009) on the 1997 Asian crisis, but is nonetheless remarkable
given the magnitude of the current trade collapse. Fears that the global economy could face
a major and potentially very long and costly trade crisis seem misplaced. We also nd quite
interesting patterns in entrants' and stayers' export values, that would deserve investigation
using truly dynamic export models.
Second, we isolate rm-, country- and product-specic components of the trade collapse
by regressing changes in trade values on observable rm, product and country characteristics
using a multi-level clustering approach. The single most important factor explaining changes
in exports is the destination country's growth rate of GDP. Had growth rates in 2008S1{2009S1
counterfactually been the same as in 2007S1{2008S1, Belgian exports would have fallen by
about 57% less than what we observe. This result is quantitatively very close to that of
Eaton et al. (2010), despite a very dierent dataset and methodology. Another nding is that
trade in consumer durables and capital goods fell more severely than trade in other product
categories. Had the fall in demand across product categories been counterfactually identical,
Belgian exports would have fallen by about 22% less than what we observe. The last nding
to emerge from our analysis is that compositional eects across rms are modest. The Belgian
credit crunch2 seems to have aected exporters somewhat: dierences in indebtedness and
debt maturity can explain up to 31% of the rm-level fall in exports. Similarly involvement
in global value chains can explain about 17% of the fall in imports. Last, we nd a minor
eect of inventory adjustment on imports, and only in the distribution sector.
Finally, to assess whether international trade has been hit more strongly than production
and domestic activity, we regress exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates ratios on
rm characteristics and industry dummies. Our econometric analysis reveals that there is
almost no pattern across rms. In particular, nancial variables have no explanatory power.
These results conrm that foreign operations were not signicantly dierently aected than
domestic operations | though exporters indeed suered from restricted access to credit, their
domestic and foreign sales were equally aected. Similarly involvement in global value chain
did not have any signicant eect on imports-to-intermediates ratios. Supply-side conjec-
2According to the Central Corporate Credit Register of the National Bank of Belgium (nbb), authorized and
used credit lines in the Belgian manufacturing sector decreased by 4:40% and 3:11% respectively between June
2008 and June 2009. Furthermore lending through letters of credit, typically used in international transactions,
decreased by 5:18% over the same period.
2tures have therefore considerably less explanatory power when comparing foreign to domestic
operations.
Overall our results suggest that a general fall in demand for tradables, especially for
consumer durables and capital goods, is mainly responsible for the recent trade collapse.
Since trade and domestic activity were aected in roughly similar ways, talk of a `trade crisis'
appears to be inappropriate.
Related literature. Firstly, our paper is quite naturally closely related to ongoing empirical
investigations of the trade collapse. Baldwin (2009), which includes a large survey of empirical
studies of the trade collapse, concludes in favor of demand-side explanations. Most studies rely
on aggregate data or descriptives, although some decompose the margins of US and French
trade, with results similar to ours. Closer to our work, Bricongne et al. (2009) provide a
careful examination of monthly French rm-level exports. They nd a dominant role for the
intensive margin, with little dierence across exporter size classes but a more severe fall in
sectors that depend more on external nance. They do not, however, systematically exploit
balance sheet data to link export changes to rm-level characteristics. Levchenko et al. (2009)
examine the variation in US exports and imports across 6-digit industries. They nd some
support for the `fragmentation explanation' and some role for durable goods, but no evidence
of a trade credit eect or of inventory adjustments. They also nd that industries experiencing
larger reductions in domestic output had a larger fall in trade. Chor and Manova (2010) nd
signicant composition eects in US imports using variation over time, interbank interest
rates (across origin countries) and nancial characteristics (across sectors). However due to
data limitations they evaluate nancial characteristics at the industry level (potentially mis-
measuring attributes of the subset of exporting rms) and industrial production indices at
the country level. Finally, Eaton et al. (2010) calibrate the Eaton-Kortum model on bilateral
trade data for 30 countries. They nd that a global demand shock, especially for durables, can
explain most of the trade fall. Interestingly they nd orders of magnitude of demand shocks
that are very comparable to ours. We view our results as complementary to theirs. They also
examine several explanations, but using the structure of a trade model while abstracting from
cross-industry and cross-rm patterns, while we do the opposite. They also nd some role
for implicit bilateral trade frictions, as proxied by Head and Ries (2001) indices, in countries
such as China and Japan.
Secondly, our work is related to studies of changes in trade patterns during major macroe-
conomic crises. Bernard et al. (2009) investigate the contributions of the dierent margins of
trade to changes in US exports to, and imports from, several Asian countries during the 1997
nancial crisis. They nd that most of the adjustments occurred at the intensive margin,
thus favoring a quick subsequent recovery. Amiti and Weinstein (2009) nd that shocks to
the health of exporters' main banks (related to Japan's real estate crisis in the 1990's) explain
up to half of changes in rm-level exports, controlling for industry-time xed eects. They
3do not nd any eect of bank health on domestic sales. Iacovone and Zavacka (2009) use a
dierence-in-dierence approach to show that past nancial crises caused a greater decrease
in exports among rms that depended to a larger extent on trade credit. Berman and Martin
(2009) show in a gravity framework that countries that use trade nance have larger bilateral
export declines in times of nancial or currency crises. Alessandria et al. (2010) calibrate
a model of inventory adjustment using data on the US car industry and aggregate US data.
Their model generates a fall in trade in excess of 33% of the fall in output, in line with the
data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines some broad facts
about the current collapse and its impact on Belgium. Section 3 decomposes the trade col-
lapse along various margins and along various country, product, and rm dimensions. Section
4 presents an econometric model to disentangle the contribution of rm, product and country
characteristics to the observed changes in the intensive margin. Section 5 examines compo-
sition eects in exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediate purchases ratios. Section 6
discusses what can be learned from our exercise. Details concerning data sources, as well
as the description and construction of variables, are relegated to Appendix A. Tables and
Figures referred to in the main text are found in AppendixC. Details on robustness checks
are provided in Appendix D.
2 The collapse of Belgian production and trade: an aggregate
snapshot
We dissect the fall in trade using data from a small open economy, Belgium. Using Belgian
data has several advantages. First, given its small size, international shocks are reasonably
exogenous to Belgium. Second, changes in Belgian GDP and trade were remarkably synchro-
nized with those of other European Union (EU) countries, thus suggesting that the Belgian
experience may apply more broadly. Last, very high export and import shares of sales and
purchases, respectively, make the `super trader' Belgium an ideal laboratory to study the
impacts of the crisis on vertical specialization and global value chains.3 Using Belgian data
has, however, the drawback of including a large amount of re-exports. Indeed, Belgium (in
particular Antwerp) is a key port of entry to and exit from the EU. Many `Belgian' rms
thus trade exclusively with non-resident partners. We deal with this potential problem in two
ways. First, we exploit the information gathered by the National Bank of Belgium (NBB)
since 2001 and systematically exclude trade by rms being identied as non-resident.4 Sec-
3According to the World Bank WDI database, Belgian merchandise imports and exports amounted jointly
to 187% of Belgian GDP in 2007.
4Non-resident rms are the main re-exporters. They are identied by the Belgian customs using information
from VAT declarations. Firms with a Belgian VAT identier that have a foreign legal address and rms oering
scal representation services to foreign rms are considered by default as non-resident. Non-residents must
report how much they trade with residents (domestic trade) and non-residents (re-exports) in VAT declarations.
4ond, we control for a rm's industry in our regressions. Doing so should largely capture the
remaining re-exports which are concentrated on wholesalers' and retailers' foreign trade.
We rst provide an aggregate snapshot of the Belgian trade collapse. Figure 1 shows that a
dramatic decrease of imports and exports is visible in the data from November 2008 onwards,
with monthly merchandise exports and imports falling by about 10% relative to their value a
year before. The situation deteriorates until January 2009, when it stabilizes at a steady lower
level until the end of our data coverage period (June 2009). Furthermore the Figure reveals
seasonal uctuations. For these reasons we will focus throughout the paper on a comparison
between the rst semesters of 2008 and 2009 (henceforth, 2008S1 and 2009S1). Exports and
imports of goods by Belgian residents fell by 26.23% and 27.77%, respectively, between these
two periods.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
Dierences across product categories. An important nding from previous studies us-
ing aggregate data (e.g., Baldwin, 2009) is that the trade collapse has not been uniform across
products. Belgium is no exception: as shown in Table 1, we observe large dierences in export
and import changes across broad product categories, despite the absence of special scal stim-
ulus packages during the period we consider.5 Trade in intermediates and consumer durables
fell much more dramatically than trade in other categories, energy being an exception. These
aggregate statistics seem to lend credence to explanations based on the disruption of global
value chains or the postponement of durable goods and equipment purchases.
Insert Table 1 about here.
Table 2 provides a ner breakdown of the trade collapse across 2-digit Prodcom-2008
codes.6 As can be seen from the gures, trade in nearly all broad product categories fell,
though in a very heterogeneous way. As for exports, `Other mining and quarrying' and `Man-
ufacture of basic metals' suered the largest drops of nearly 50%, while a few other categories
like `Printing and reproduction of recorded media', `Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical
products and preparations' and `Manufacture of other transport equipment' saw their exports
increase during the period. A similar pattern also holds for imports.
Insert Table 2 about here.
They are classied as `pure' non-residents if they are not involved in any trade transactions with residents, and
as `mixed' non-residents otherwise (which is the default category, rms must apply to get pure non-resident
status). Non-resident rms are not compelled to le balance sheets. Non-resident foreign trade accounted for
about 26% of Belgian exports and 22% of Belgian imports in 2008. The gures for 2009 are 28% and 25%,
respectively.
5See Appendix A for more information about product grouping using the EU Main Industrial Groupings
classication.
6The Prodcom classication, and in particular the 2008 version, is an hybrid product/activity classication
used in the EU as a bridge between the main traded product classication (the CN8 nomenclature) and the
main activity classication (NACE).
5Foreign and domestic operations. In line with developments in other OECD countries,
Belgian trade fell much more than GDP. Across all goods, the fall of about 26% in exports
and 28% in imports must be contrasted with a `modest' 3.25% fall in nominal GDP over the
same period. However, since it involves essentially manufactured goods, trade is not value
added so that the fall in trade should be compared with the fall in manufacturing production
value. Restricting the analysis to those goods for which data on production is available from
the Prodcom dataset, the fall of about 25% in exports and 24% in imports closely mimics
the roughly 25% fall in manufacturing production value over the same period.7 Hence, in the
aggregate the fall in trade was commensurate with the fall in manufacturing production, as
can be further seen from Figure 2.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
Restricting ourselves again to goods for which data on production is available, Figure 2
reports monthly changes in the export-to-production and import-to-production ratios from
January 2005 to June 2009. The gure conrms the absence of a strong dierential trend
between production and trade for Belgium: if anything, it points to an increase (rather than
a decrease) of these measures. At the 2-digit product level, Table 2 further compares those
same two ratios using data for 2008S1 and 2009S1. Inspection of the table reveals that the
aggregate results depicted in Figure 2 also hold within broad product categories.
Geographical structure of the trade collapse. Table 3 breaks down changes in total
Belgian exports plus imports with its top-100 trading partners between 2008S1 and 2009S1.
On the one hand, trade with the Netherlands (Belgium's most important trading partner)
fell by 31.83%. Trade with other major EU partners (Germany, France, UK, Italy) as well as
with Japan, Korea and the US fell by roughly similar magnitudes. On the other hand, trade
with China and Hong Kong, the GDP of which kept growing during the period, was much
less aected. While there does not seem to be any clear geographical structure in trade ow
changes, GDP growth could be a promising dimension to explore.8
Insert Table 3 about here.
Summary of the aggregate snapshot. Belgian exports and imports fell faster than GDP
but roughly commensurate with manufacturing production value. The fall in trade showed
substantial variation across product categories, with particularly strong drops in `Consumer
durables' and `Capital goods'. To some extent, it also varied across origin and destination
7See Appendix A for further details on the Prodcom dataset. Based on that dataset, manufacturing pro-
duction volumes fell by 18%, while manufacturing production value fell by 25%. These statistics are consistent
with the small changes in overall exports-to-production and imports-to-production ratios presented in Table
2. Observe also that the overall change in prices and quantities is roughly comparable to the one of aggregate
trade presented in Section 3 below.
8The suspiciously large growth of trade with Ireland might be related to abusive transfer pricing given that
that Ireland's corporate tax rate is substantially lower than Belgium's.
6markets: trade with EU partners, Japan and the US was more aected than trade with China
and Hong Kong.
Aggregate descriptive evidence at the product, sector or country level is useful to gauge
the magnitude of the trade collapse but is insucient to provide a compelling explanation for
its cause(s). Firms are the basic units that trade products across countries, and aggregate
data may lead to misleading conclusions by masking compositional eects. Table 2 suggests,
for example, that exports have decreased more for some product categories than for others,
but this may be due to particular problems faced by rms selling these products or the
markets in which they are traded instead of the goods' attributes themselves. Broad product
groups, which contain hundreds of products, might also hide substantial heterogeneity within
categories.
To deal with these problems, we therefore now take the analysis to ner levels of disag-
gregation. In Section 3 we rst decompose the contribution of the dierent margins of trade
to the trade collapse, using exports and imports at the rm-product-country level. The key
ndings from this analysis will guide us in specifying an econometric model in Section 4 to
separately identify the magnitude and signicance of rm-, country- and product-level de-
terminants of the fall in trade. Section 5 then compares domestic and foreign operations to
assess whether the trade collapse is driven by a generalized fall in demand for manufacturing
goods, or whether the `smoking gun' must be sought elsewhere.
3 The margins of the trade collapse
To gauge each margin's contribution to the Belgian trade collapse, we perform a decomposition
of changes in exports and imports along the lines suggested by Bernard et al. (2009).
3.1 The extensive and intensive margins
Belgian exports X in a given time period can be decomposed as X = f cg x, where f, c and
g denote the the number of exporters, the average number of countries each exporter sells to,
and the average number of products each exporter ships to each country, respectively; and





refers to exports in another period, and applying this  transformation to the other
variables, we may decompose the change in Belgian exports between 2008S1 and 2009S1 as
follows:
X = f cg x; (1)
Changes in the rst three terms of expression (1) are referred to as changes in the extensive
margin of trade, while changes in the last term are referred to as changes in the intensive
7margin.9 Information about physical quantities exported allows us to further decompose
changes in the intensive margin into changes in average quantities (q) and in average prices
(p): x  qp. We provide more detailed information about how this latter decomposition
is implemented in Appendix A. The change in imports, M, can be decomposed in the same
way.
Insert Table 4 about here.
As mentioned earlier Belgian exports for all rm-country-product combinations fell by
about 26% between 2008S1 and 2009S1. Table 4 reveals that despite that huge fall, the
number of exporters and the number of products shipped on average by each exporter to each
country increased by 0.96% and by 0.16%, respectively. The average number of countries
served by Belgian exporters dropped by -1.92%. Changes at the extensive margin hence
decreased Belgian exports by (1:0096  0:9808  1:0016   1)  100% =  0:82%. As can be
seen from Column 6 in Table 4, changes at the extensive margin are dwarfed by changes at the
intensive margin. Indeed, the average value of exports per rm-country-product fell by 25.63%
between 2008S1 and 2009S1. Thus, as can be seen from the last line, the intensive margin
contributes to more than 97% of the observed change in exports, whereas the contribution of
the extensive margin is less than 3%.10
One distinct advantage of our dataset is that it provides information on either quantities or
weights of shipments for each rm-country-product observation. This allows us, as mentioned
before, to decompose the change in export values more nely into quantity and price changes.11
As can be seen from the last two columns of Table 4, changes in the intensive margin are mainly
driven by changes in quantities shipped. On average, Belgian exports by rm-country-product
decreased in terms of quantities by 20%. Average unit prices also fell, but `only' by 7.04%. A
rst conclusion thus emerges: the collapse of Belgian exports is overwhelmingly driven by a fall
in sales per rm-country-product, itself driven to a large extent by a sharp fall in quantities
exported and some decrease in unit prices.
Insert Table 5 about here.
Table 5 performs the same decomposition for total Belgian imports, which fell by about
28% across all rm-country-product combinations between 2008S1 and 2009S1. Observe that
9We have no information on the number of trading partners or shipments for each exporter per country-
product combination. Thus, our intensive margin x still contains `extensive margin' components that we
cannot isolate.
10Combining the two margins of trade, the total change in Belgian exports is given by (1:0096  0:9808 
1:00160:7437 1)100% =  26:23%. Letting EM and IM denote the extensive and the intensive margins, this
total change can be expressed as X = IMEM. Using logarithms, we compute the relative contribution of
the intensive and the extensive margins to the total change in trade as ln(IM)=ln(X) and ln(EM)=ln(X),
respectively.
11For the ner decomposition using changes in quantities and in prices, the total change in exports is
decomposed as (1:0096  0:9808  1:0016  0:8  0:9296   1)  100% =  26:23%, where the last two terms in
the decomposition are the changes in the average quantity and the average price, respectively.
8the overall picture is very similar to that of exports, although there is even slightly less change
at the extensive margin. There seems to be some `downsizing' in terms of the average number
of countries and the average number of products per country each rm imports, but this is
almost completely oset by more rms importing. As can be seen from the last two columns
and the last line in Table 5, the intensive margin accounts again for almost all the change
in imports and most of it is driven by a sharp decrease in quantities. A second conclusion
thus emerges: the collapse of Belgian imports is overwhelmingly driven by a fall in imports
per rm-country-product, itself driven to a large extent by a sharp fall in quantities imported
and some decrease in unit prices.
To gauge whether the trade collapse, visible in Tables 4 and 5, roughly aects all rms,
sectors, and trading partners equally, we also repeat the above decompositions by splitting
our sample more nely along various dimensions.
Insert Table 6 about here.
For example Table 6 presents results for dierent product categories. The overall decom-
position of margins, while not identical, remains qualitatively very similar. In particular, the
intensive margin remains dominant whereas changes at the extensive margin are small. In the
same spirit we split our sample in subgroups of origin and destination countries, rm size and
productivity, nationality of ownership, and debt structure. Results, which are qualitatively
very similar, are relegated to Appendix B.
To summarize, the most striking and robust feature to emerge from our data is that the `full
extensive margin' (i.e., the number of rms times the number of countries per rm times the
number of products per country-rm) is extremely stable, both for imports and exports. This
result continues to hold true when we decompose the sample into various subgroups as shown
in Appendix B. Put dierently, almost all of the action takes place at the intensive margin,
with virtually no change occurring at the extensive margin. This nding rstly highlights the
extreme exibility of rms, of their input suppliers, and of their clients. Secondly, negligible
changes at the extensive margin, even in the wake of a major shock, suggest that sunk costs
are an extremely important component of trade costs. If trade costs were recoverable (either
variable or xed) we should have seen a massive contraction at the extensive margin with rms
exiting markets and severing trade relations to cut losses. Thirdly, our ndings also suggest
that trade should pick up again rapidly as the recession fades and as the macroeconomic
environment returns to normal.12
3.2 Firm dynamics and the trade collapse
Table 11 shows that about 98% of both 2008S1 and 2009S1 exports were accounted for by
`stayers' | rms that were exporting in both semesters. The remaining share in 2008 was
due to `exiters' | rms that exported in 2008S1 but not in 2009S1. The remaining share in
12In April 2010, Belgian monthly imports and exports were already back to their April 2008 level.
92009S1 was accounted for by `entrants' | rms that exported in 2009S1 but not in 2008S1.
Table 11 further reveals that the 2007S1{2008S1 patterns were very similar, thus suggesting
that 2008S1{2009S1 was not exceptional in terms of rm dynamics. Despite slightly more
exit from and slightly less entry into foreign trade, and a smaller export share of entrants
during the crisis, the overall pattern is not very dierent from the one in 2007S1{2008S1. In
particular, there is still a large turnover and little net entry despite the crisis. Finally, the
observed patterns also broadly hold for imports.
Insert Table 11 about here.
The absence of massive exit from foreign trade during a major crisis is striking. This
nding gives further support to dynamic trade models with sunk entry costs (e.g., Das et
al., 2007). The fact that almost all rms remain active traders during a period where trade
contracts by 25% can be explained by the option value of staying in the presence of these
sunk entry costs. Of course, an alternative explanation could be that rms expected a short
crisis.
Insert Table 12 about here.
Table 12 summarizes a related margin decomposition where we compare trade of the
2008S1 and 2009S1 cohorts of stayers, entrants and exiters. In the case of exports, it reveals
some interesting facts that can be related to recent models of export dynamics. Comparing
across cohorts, 2009S1 entrants and exiters fared much worse than the previous cohort (a 77%
decrease in export values). Meanwhile, 2009S1 stayers fared worse than the previous cohort,
partly including the same rms, but less dramatically so (about 27% decrease in export values).
This nding is at odds with Melitz-type models, where a common demand shock should aect
entrants and stayers identically. Part of the explanation involves compositional eects through
dierences in entrants' number of products and countries served. Table 12 shows clearly that
entrants are much more strongly aected at the extensive margin than stayers. Nonetheless
the magnitude of the gap between entrants and stayers suggests that something else is at
work. Overall a more sophisticated dynamic trade model is necessary to explain why entry
remained stable but 2009S1 entrants exported much less than the previous cohort and than
stayers (as can be seen from Tables 11 and 12). In fact this nding could help to discriminate
between the various mechanisms suggested by the recent literature.13 We leave this task for
future research as it goes beyond the scope of this paper.
In the case of imports, we nd that entry remained stable but more exit occurred. There
were considerably more exiters than in the previous cohort, but the increase was oset by an
equally considerable fall in average imports. Average imports of exiters fell by about as much
13Recent work on rm-level export dynamics builds on several mechanisms to explain export dynamics at the
intensive and extensive margins: serially correlated permanent shocks to TFP, credit or capacity constraints,
uncertainty about demand or costs, search and learning dynamics, reputation-building, endogenous R&D
investment or quality upgrading.
10as those of stayers. Overall, the rise in the number of importers during the trade collapse
was dwarfed by the fall in the intensive margin, as noted earlier, but it would deserve further
investigation.
While our descriptive exercises already highlight several important insights, they are not
suited to identify the magnitudes, signicance and contribution of the dierent determinants
of the trade fall. We therefore next turn to econometric analysis, taking full advantage of our
rm-country-product trade data and balance sheet data.
4 Firm-, country-, and product-level characteristics: the de-
terminants of the trade collapse
The previous Section showed that the bulk of the fall in Belgian trade occurred at the intensive
margin. Therefore we can safely analyze the determinants of the trade collapse by focusing
solely on the intensive margin, i.e. rm-country-product transaction values. As further seen
in the previous section, 98% of 2008S1 and 2009S1 exports were accounted for by stayers.
Given the overwhelming contribution of stayers to export and import values, we can explore
the determinants of the fall in trade by restricting the analysis to these rms.14
In this Section we aim to quantify the contribution of the various conjectures put forth
in the literature, by looking at the composition of the fall in trade along the rm, product
and country dimensions. If, say, highly leveraged rms experienced a greater fall in trade
(conditional on other rm characteristics as well as on the characteristics of their products
and destination markets) we can infer that restricted access to credit played a role in explaining
the trade collapse. Furthermore, we can then try to gauge its magnitude on the observed fall
in trade.
4.1 An econometric model of changes in trade values
The primary data for our regression analysis consists in export and import values by rm-
country-product in 2008S1 and 2009S1, for stayers only. We aggregate data to the HS4 product
level (more than 1,000 product categories) and consider only `continuing transactions', i.e.
rm-country-product trade triples that record positive values in both semesters. The aim is
to provide econometric results that can make sense of aggregate changes in trade. Focusing
on continuing transactions avoids giving too much weight to low-value transactions (most
discontinuous transactions are low value) while allowing for meaningful multi-level clustering
of the standard errors. 15
14Observe that such an analysis would be awed in the presence of large changes at the extensive margin.
Had the number of exporting rms drastically fallen, we would have needed to analyze the determinants of
export participation before and after the collapse (by using, for example, a probit approach). The stability of
the extensive margin across rm, products and markets allows us to neglect these determinants in the analysis
as they are of second-order importance.
15By denition, continuing transactions are a subset of stayers' transactions. They account for the lion's
share of trade values in both 2008S1 and 2009S1. More precisely, there were 272,216 continuing transactions out
11We describe the econometric model we use for exports, the model for imports being iden-
tical. Using data on continuous transactions only, we regress the change in log export values
Xicp  logX2009
icp   logX2008
icp on rm, country and product characteristics that proxy for
the various conjectures put forward to explain the trade collapse. Formally, the estimating
equation is given by:
Xicp =  + Wi + s + Zc + Sp + icp (2)
where icp, is a residual term having the standard properties for the consistency of OLS, s
is a sector xed eect (two digit NACE classication rev 1.1)16, and Wi, Zc and Sp denote
rm, country, and product characteristics, respectively. In the case of rm covariates, we
use lagged information from 2007 balance sheets to avoid endogeneity of rm characteristics
(such as productivity, employment, and nancial structure) with respect to the trade collapse.
Having data varying along three dimensions we follow the procedure of Cameron et al. (2006)
and apply multi-level clustering to obtain more reliable standard errors.
Equation (2) constitutes an econometric model of change in trade values that is likely to
remain valid outside the trade collapse period. When considering changes in trade between two
`normal' semesters one would expect that, for example, the productivity of a rm and/or the
GDP growth of the destination country, the latter proxing for changes in aggregate demand,
would matter in explaining changes in trade values. To identify what is peculiar to the
2008S1{2009S1 trade collapse we compare estimates obtained from (2) in a `normal' period
with those obtained during the collapse. To this end, we also estimate (2) using changes in
trade values of continuing transactions between 2007S1 and 2008S1.17
Insert Table 13 about here.
Table 13 summarizes the list of covariates we use in (2). All rm characteristics prexed by
D- are binary variables, taking value 1 if a particular characteristic is above the sectoral median
across all trading rms and 0 otherwise. Doing so allows us to maximize the number of rms
we can include in the analysis while reducing the risk of bias due to measurement error and
potential outliers. It also provides us, as in the case of standardized regression coecients, with
a relevant metric to compare the contribution of the dierent rm characteristics to changes
of the 433,529 (430,000) export transactions in 2008S1 (2009S1), thus corresponding to 62.79% (63.31%) of the
number of total transactions and to 93.66% (91.83%) of total transaction values. The observed fall in the value
of continuing export transactions between 2008S1 and 2009S1 is 27.48%, which is quite close to the 26.23%
decrease recorded for all export transactions. As for imports, there were 331,981 continuing transactions out of
the 560,258 (559,530) transactions in 2008S1 (2009S1), thus corresponding to 59.26% (59.33%) of the number
of total transactions and to 92.83% (90.47%) of total transaction values. The observed fall in the value of
continuing import transactions between 2008S1 and 2009S1 is 29.57%, which again closely matches the 27.77%
decrease recorded for all import transactions.
16The NACE rev 1.1 is the main industry classication in the European Community. It draws extensively
on the ISIC rev 3.
17To ensure consistency data used to construct rm-level variables and NACE dummies come from 2006
balance sheet and trade data. GDP growth and exchange rate variables are lagged by one year relative to the
2008S1-2009S1 regressions.
12in trade values. Last but not least, the binary specication is able to broadly account for non-
linear eects of the covariates. As a robustness check, we also ran the same regressions with
all variables in continuous form and provide standardized coecients. The results, reported
in Appendix D, are qualitatively identical. In what follows, we thus present the results using
the binary variables.
4.2 Results
Table 14 reports coecients and standard errors obtained by estimating (2) by OLS for
2008S1{2009S1 (left panel, `Into the collapse') and for 2007S1{2008S1 (right panel, `Before the
collapse'). Considering the former period, we have 204,598 (out of 272,216) continuing export
transactions for which all data on rm, country, and product characteristics is available. These
transactions represent 69.50% of 2008S1 export values and 68.41% of 2009S1 export values.
The fall in export values between 2008S1 and 2009S1 corresponding to these transactions is
27.21%, which is very close to the 27.48% export decrease for all continuing transactions.
Overall, the data covers 6,959 rms, 170 countries, and 1,075 HS4 products. As for imports,
we have 255,035 (out of 331,981) continuing import transactions for which all the data is
available. These transactions represent 70.47% of 2008S1 import values and 67.62% of 2009S1
import values. The fall in import values between 2008S1 and 2009S1 corresponding to these
continuing transactions is 30.66%, in line with the 29.57% import decrease for all continuing
transactions. Overall, the data covers 13,545 rms, 148 countries, and 1,099 HS4 products.
One may a priori worry about potential biases that arise because we have to drop a number
of continuing transactions for which data is missing. However, balance sheet data are missing
mainly for Belgian aliates of foreign groups that do no exist as a separate legal entity in
Belgium. Such rms are not required to report unconsolidated accounts even if they are
technically considered as residents by Belgian customs.18 Including these rms in the analysis
would have been desirable, but a positive aspect of dropping them is that they are likely
to engage in substantial amounts of re-exports. Altogether our focus on Belgian residents
only, the exclusion of the above-mentioned rms, and the inclusion of industry xed eects
represent a very conservative way of dealing with the issue of re-exports.
Insert Table 14 about here.
Firm characteristics. In general Table 14 shows that rm-level characteristics are rarely
signicant, that most coecients are very small, and that the model's explanatory power is
very weak. Table 15 also shows that there is no evident problem of colinearity among our rm-
level variables. Our results thus suggest that: (i) the trade collapse has been quite symmetric
across rms within a given industry; (ii) some of the supply-side explanations of the trade
collapse clearly play at best a second-order role. For example consider a rm's reliance on
18In addition, some small rms are not compelled to le balance sheets. See Appendix A for further details
on both subjects.
13external nance, following the measure proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998), Dext fin dep.
The  0:0291 coecient in the second column of Table 14, though highly signicant, means
that imports of rms with above-median reliance on external nance fell by 2.91 percentage
points more during the crisis than those of below-median rms. The magnitude is rather small
relative to the overall fall in imports of 27.77%, and comparable to that of the coecient of
 0:0256 in a `normal' period such as 2007S1{2008S1. Given the estimated standard errors,
we cannot reject the hypothesis that the `crisis coecient' is not signicantly dierent from
the coecient in a `normal' period.
Insert Table 15 about here.
We now discuss results for each group of covariates. Large or productive rms' exports
grew no faster than other rms' exports, unlike in the previous year. This conrms our
margin decomposition of Section 3, with the additional insight that neither rm, nor country
or product composition eects are to blame.
Involvement in global value-added chains (as measured by Dinterm share, Dshare exp sales,
Dshare imp interm, and Dvalue add chain) did not seem to matter more for exports in 2008S1{
2009S1 than in 2007S1{2008S1. This casts doubt on the hypothesis of a disruption of global
value chains (Yi, 2009). Observe further that Dshare imp interm is not signicant for export
growth into the collapse, while it was negative and signicant before, the opposite of what
the hypothesis actually would suggest. The import growth regression delivers a more complex
message. On the one hand, Dshare imp interm and Dvalue add chain have negative and signicant
coecients, as the hypothesis would suggest, but the coecients were almost identical in
the 2007S1-2008S1 regression! They may therefore capture a longer-term trend in imports
of intermediate-intensive rms. On the other hand, Dinterm share and Dshare exp sales have
negative and signicant coecients in 2008S1-2009S1 but not 2007S1-2008S1, and of a low
magnitude: above-median rms' import growth diered by 6 percentage points in total. To
further assess this magnitude, we predict counterfactual import growth in the absence of
involvement in global value chains, i.e., when Dinterm share and Dshare exp sales equal zero, all
else equal. We nd that 17.29% of the overall import fall would not have occurred in this
counterfactual world. Finally, foreign ownership and multinational status dummies are not
signicant. Summarizing, we nd little evidence of a disruption of global value chains causing
the trade collapse. Dierences in the intensity of intermediate imports or exports do not
account for the export fall, and account for at most 17:29% of the import fall. Dierences in
multinational status have strictly no explanatory power.
Variables proxying for rms' nancial structure (Dext fin dep, Dshare debts o liab, Dshare debts due after one,
Dshare fin debt) appear to play some role in 2008S1{2009S1 export changes. Firms with shorter
debt maturity and a larger fraction of nancial (as opposed to commercial) debt experienced
a substantially larger fall of exports into the trade collapse. By contrast, the coecients are
not signicant in the 2007S1{2008S1 regressions. Our ndings thus lend some support to the
14trade credit crunch hypothesis (Auboin, 2009; Chor and Manova, 2010). How large is that
eect? Firms with above-median debt maturity experienced a 5.6 percentage point higher
export growth, whereas rms with above-median nancial debts saw their exports shrink by
about 4.6 percentage points more. Both values must be compared with the 26.23% total
fall in export values. To further assess the magnitude, we predict the counterfactual export
growth in the absence of negative nancial eects, i.e., when Dshare debts due after one equals
one and Dshare fin debt equals zero, all else equal. We nd that about one-third (31.33%) of the
2008S1-2009S1 fall in exports can be attributed to nance. It is worth noting, however, that
nancial variables do not seem to aect changes in import values at all. Furthermore, almost
no nancial variable is signicant in the regressions with continuous variables presented as a
robustness check in Appendix D.19
The coecient for Dshare stock, proxying for inventory capacity, is not signicant for im-
ports in both regressions. This contrasts with the inventory adjustment explanation (Alessan-
dria et al., 2010): we would have expected imports of rms with greater inventory capacity to
contract more, all else equal. In fact only the coecient in the 2008S1{2009S1 export growth
regression is signicant, and with a positive sign! Firms with higher inventory-to-sales ratios
contracted exports by less, which might reect dierences in access to working capital rather
than inventory strategies. Still, it may be argued that inventory adjustments occur primarily
among distributors. Therefore we also run the same regressions on a subsample comprising
rms from the distribution sector only (NACE industries 50, 51 and 52), which represented
40.25% of Belgian imports in 2008S1.20 We nd that imports of distributors with above-
median inventory-sales ratios fell by 2.75 percentage points more than other distributors in
2008S1-2009S1. This coecient can account for 10.82% of the import fall of the distribution
sector, using the counterfactual technique mentioned earlier. However we nd no eects of
stocks in the earlier period, or in the export growth regressions. Overall we conclude that
although inventory adjustment accounted for some of the import fall in an important sector,
it played a minor role in the trade collapse.
Country characteristics. We view GDP growth as the key variable to gauge the contri-
bution of a demand shock to the collapse of exports. Two results stand out from our analysis.
First, the coecient diers widely between 2007S1{2008S1 and 2008S1{2009S1. In a `normal
year', the coecient of log export change with respect to the trading partners' percentage
GDP growth is around one percent (0:0138). This means that a 1% increase in the aggregate
demand of a given country, as proxied by its percentage GDP growth, translates into a 1.38%
increase in export values to that destination. To the extent that such an increase in exports
reects a proportional change in the demand for tradable goods, our coecient is broadly
consistent with standard cross-section/cross-country gravity models in which the coecient
19As in most related work, our variables only imperfectly capture access to credit in general and trade nance
in particular.
20Regression tables are omitted to save space but are available upon request.
15for the GDP of the export destination is close to unity. However, during the trade collapse,
the responsiveness of changes in log export values with respect to percentage GDP changes
of the importing countries increased signicantly (0:0253), thus suggesting that the global
recession induced a disproportionate fall in the demand for tradable goods. Using our model
to evaluate the counterfactual situation in which GDP growth rates for 2008S1{2009S1 are
replaced with the rates prevailing in 2007S1{2008S1, all else equal, delivers the result that
the export drop would have been 57.14% less. We may thus conclude that about 60% of
the export collapse can be attributed to a generalized fall in the demand for tradable goods.
These results are very similar to those of Eaton et al. (2010), though both approaches use
very dierent data and methodologies.
Turning to imports, the interpretation of the GDP growth coecient, which now refers
to the exporting country, is more dicult. In any case, as can be seen from Table 14, these
coecients are not signicant in both 2008S1-2009S1 and 2007S1{2008S1. We can nevertheless
gauge the counterfactual impact of Belgian GDP growth on imports. Using the GDP growth
coecient estimated for exports and using data on Belgian GDP growth for the two periods,
we nd that 47.30% of the import drop can be attributed to a fall in demand for tradable
goods in Belgium. Hence, almost half of the fall in imports is due to the demand shock.
The coecients of the two dummies for trade with non-EU countries in and outside of the
OECD are both positive, sizeable, and signicant (in 3 of the 4 cases) in the crisis period.
In stark contrast, the same coecients in the period before the collapse are negative and
signicant. This means that exports and imports with non-EU countries grew less in 2007S1{
2008S1 than with EU partners (the reference category). This pattern was reversed in 2008S1{
2009S1: trade with countries outside of the EU helped to mitigate the trade collapse. However,
given that trade with such countries represents only about 23% of Belgian exports and 25% of
imports, the positive eect has been largely oset by the collapse of trade with EU partners.
The fact that non-EU trade, especially imports, fell less than EU trade suggests indirectly
that protectionist measures played only a minor role in explaining the trade collapse.
As for uctuations in exchange rates, the magnitude of the coecients indicates that they
have aected exports more strongly during the trade collapse period as compared to 2007S1{
2008S1. Still, the reverse holds for import growth where exchange rates had no signicant
impact on 2008S1{2009S1 while being negative and signicant in the previous period. How-
ever, despite the size of the coecients, the implied magnitudes for changes in export values
are small. Using the estimated model to evaluate the counterfactual situation in which no
exchange rate change would have occurred during 2008S1{2009S1, i.e. exch rate change=0,
reveals that uctuations of the euro can be blamed for only a very little share (5.44%) of
the total drop in Belgian exports. The coecient of exch rate change in the imports growth
regression is not signicant.
16Product characteristics. The reference group for product dummies is consumer non-
durables. Therefore, the foregoing discussions and the magnitudes of the fall in demand apply
solely to this category of goods. However, in line with the margin decomposition provided
in Section 3, product dummies for the categories intermediates, capital goods, and consumer
durables are all negative and strongly signicant in the 2008S1{2009S1 period, thereby indi-
cating that these goods experienced a larger fall in trade. By contrast, in the 2007S1-2008S1
period these categories did not display a signicantly higher or lower export or import growth
when compared to consumer non-durables.
What are the causes of such dierent behavior? The answer is likely to be a dierential fall
in demand. To provide evidence of this we estimated the 2008S1{2009S1 export growth model
separately for each of the broad product categories.21 Our estimates of the growth rate GDP
coecient are in line with the ultimate conclusion of Baldwin (2009) that `postponable goods'
have been particularly hit by the negative demand shock aecting tradable goods. More pre-
cisely, the coecient when restricting the estimation to intermediates goods (0.0254) is higher
than that when restricting estimations to consumer non-durables (0.0234). Even higher coef-
cients (0.0284 and 0.0412) are obtained in capital goods and consumer durables regressions,
respectively.
Evaluating a counterfactual scenario in which the fall in trade would have been the same
across product categories and equal to the one of the reference group `consumer non-durables',
i.e. setting product dummies coecients equals to zero in the 2008S1{2009S1 export and im-
port growth equations, delivers the following results: 22.36% of the export collapse is due to a
more severe shock aecting postponable goods, the equivalent gure for imports being 27.15%.
Finally, the coecients of the Rauch (1999) measure of product dierentiation (fraclib diff)
before and into the trade collapse suggest that more dierentiated goods experienced a smaller
fall in trade, though the implied magnitude is rather small.
Summary of ndings. In the case of exports, our results point to a generalized fall in
demand in tradables, especially consumer durables and capital goods. Evidence for this is
provided by an unusually large GDP growth coecient, sizeable product dummies, and widely
dierent GDP growth coecients in regressions for separate product categories. Restricted
access to nance seems to play a role in the fall in exports, albeit of a smaller magnitude. We
nd no strong evidence for the disruption of global value chains or for inventory adjustment.
In the case of imports, a fall in Belgian demand seems to be the main explanation. We nd
some limited role for involvement in global value chains (about 6 percentage points out of
the 27 percentage point fall in imports), but again little role for trade nance and no role for
inventory adjustments.
21Regression tables are omitted to save space but are available upon request.
175 Trade crisis or trade collapse?
So far, we have uncovered strong evidence that a fall in tradeable goods demand (particularly
strong for `postponable goods') has been the major cause of the trade collapse. There is also
some evidence that nancial constraints contributed to that fall, though to a lesser extent.
Observe that these ndings do not per se imply that there has been a trade crisis, i.e., a
situation in which international trade suered more than domestic trade. To investigate this
question, we now examine changes in exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates ratios
at the rm level.22 If international trade per se is in a crisis, both ratios should have fallen
during the period we consider.
As shown earlier by Table 2 and Figure 2, there is no systematic fall in exports-to-
production and imports-to-production ratios, both in the whole economy and across broad
product categories. In fact, those ratios even increased in some product categories, thus im-
plying that domestic production contracted in some cases more than trade. This descriptive
evidence already casts some doubts on the existence of a `trade crisis' in Belgium. Never-
theless, there might still be compositional eects across rms and industries, and those can
provide valuable information on the channel(s) through which the fall in demand aected
Belgian exports and imports. We therefore now revisit this issue using a more detailed micro-
econometric analysis of the export-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates ratios.
In what follows we exploit data on rm turnover and intermediates purchases for 2008S1
and 2009S1.23 The data comes from monthly and quarterly VAT declarations.24 We construct
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rm i's turnover and X2008
i stands for exports aggregated at the
rm-level. Analogously, we dene the log of the 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i denotes rm i's total purchases of intermediates and I2008
i represents imports
aggregated at the rm-level. For 2009, 2009
i;X and 2009
i;I are dened in the same way using 2009
22Observe that exports-to-turnover ratios are monotonically related to exports-to-domestic-sales ratios. We
thus use the former in what follows since we have no information on domestic sales.
23Ideally we would like to examine whether rms' exports and imports fall by more than the value of their
production (as opposed to turnover and purchased intermediates, which potentially include re-exporting or
other commercial activities). At the time of writing, however, the required rm-level production data is
not available. Even when that data becomes available it will only cover the sample of large rms used by the
Belgian National Institute of Statistics to provide aggregate production gures (Prodcom survey). We therefore
examine ratios of exports to turnover and imports to intermediates purchases to maximize the number of rms
we can include in our analysis.
24The frequency at which declarations have to be led depends on the rm's size. See Appendix A.
18rst-semester data. The sample of rms covered by the analysis is given by those stayers for
which both information on balance sheets and VAT declarations are available, i.e 8,360 rms
among the 12,964 export stayers and 14,388 rms among the 23,782 import stayers. VAT
declarations are virtually exhaustive so that the binding data constraint is the availability of
balance sheet information. The data cover 73.07% (73.61%) of 2008S1 (2009S1) exports and
71.33% (70.20%) of 2008S1 (2009S1) imports by stayers. As explained before, most rms that
have to be dropped are Belgian aliates belonging to foreign groups that are considered as
residents by Belgian customs but do not exist as a separate legal entity. It is likely that a
substantial part of the trade done by these rms involves re-exporting and, in that respect,
their exclusion from the analysis is more of an asset than a liability. In addition, some small
rms do not submit balance sheets and have to be dropped.
Let us rst highlight a few descriptives about the constructed ratios. The dierence
2009
i;X  2008
i;X has a mean of  0:0290 and a median of  0:0183: the average exports-to-turnover
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in 2008 was 35:52%, meaning that the 2:9% fall
translates into a meagre 1 percentage point reduction (2:9%0:3552 = 0:0103). We can hence
already conclude that its decrease has, on average, been negligible | the ratio of exports-to-
turnover at the rm level has not been aected by the trade collapse. Observe furthermore that
the correlation between 2009
i;X and 2008
i;X equals 0:84 for our 8,360 observations, thus suggesting
that rm patterns have been very stable during the trade collapse. Results for imports-to-
intermediates ratios convey the same message. The mean of 2009
i;I   2008
i;I equals  0:0296,
while the median equals  0:0124. The average imports-to-intermediates ratio decreased by
2:96% while the median ratio fell by 1:24%, starting from an average level of 26:16%. Thus,
changes in that ratio were negligible too. Last, the correlation between 2009
i;I and 2008
i;I is 0:79
for our 14,388 observations.




i;I on the same set of rm-level characteristics
used in the previous section and listed in Table 13. We use OLS and provide robust stan-
dard errors. To take into account the fact that some covariates would also aect exports-to-
production and imports-to-production ratios in a `normal period', we also report estimations
of the same model for 2007{2008. Both sets of results are reported in Table 16. As an addi-
tional robustness check, we also ran the same regressions with either no NACE dummies or
with rm variables in continuous form. The results are qualitatively identical and the tables
are reported in Appendix D.
Insert Table 16 about here.
As can be seen from the left panel of Table 16, most rm-level characteristics are not sig-
nicant in explaining changes in either exports-to-turnover or imports-to-intermediates ratios
for the trade collapse period. In some cases, a signicant coecient in 2008S1{2009S1 corre-
sponds to a coecient of the same magnitude in 2007S1{2008S1 (for example, Dshare exp sales
for exports, which is not statistically dierent across the two periods). This holds despite
19the fact that, as shown in the previous section and in Table 15, there is no major problem
of collinearity among regressors. Inspection of standard errors reveals that nancial variables
are not signicantly dierent from each other in the two periods. We may thus conclude that
the negative eect of nancial variables identied in the analysis of the previous section has
aected foreign trade and domestic activities equally. In other words, the credit crunch has
not disproportionately hurt the activity of trading across national borders per se.
There are some eects for rm size and productivity, as well as for some variables capturing
the degree of involvement in international trade and value-added chains. However, the signs
are sometimes opposite to what one would expect from a `trade crisis story'. For example, the
positive and signicant coecient of foreign-owned rms (for) in the imports-to-intermediates
analysis suggests that foreign-owned rms (which are more likely to be part of global pro-
duction networks) saw their imports-to-intermediates ratios fall less than domestically owned
rms. In any case, the implied magnitudes are small. The strongest piece of evidence that we
nd is that rms which were more involved in global value chains in 2007 (Dvalue add chain) saw
their exports and imports fall by more than their turnover or intermediates purchases. Though
not signicant, the 2007{2008 export coecient of Dvalue add chain is half of the magnitude of
the one in 2008-2009, thus suggesting that some of these rm variables capture mean-reversion
eects. This is, for example, very clear for Dshare exp sales in the exports-to-turnover anal-
ysis. However, even when considering the full magnitude of the coecient, a rm with an
export-to-turnover ratio of 0.4999 (which is the mean value for rms with Dvalue add chain = 1
in 2008) would see its ratio in 2009 decrease to 49:99%   10:06%  0:4999 = 0:4496 had the
trade collapse aected such a rm in the same way as those with Dvalue add chain = 0. This is
hardly strong evidence that rms highly involved in global value-added chains have been hit
by a major crisis specic to international trade.
As for the (unreported but available upon request) NACE dummies, they are generally
insignicant, the reference industry being `Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers'. Only 2 of the 44 (2  22) manufacturing industry dummies has a signicant coef-
cient at the 5% condence level in the 2008S1{2009S1 exports-to-turnover and imports-to-
intermediates regressions. Furthermore, there is no signicant evidence that the distribution
industry has been aected dierently.
The fact that almost all coecients in the exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates
regressions are insignicant and that, even when they are signicant, their magnitude is small,
leads us logically to conclude that it is not a trade crisis | just a trade collapse caused by
a strong decrease in the demand for tradables that has equally aected domestic and foreign
operations.
206 What have we learned?
Using detailed trade and balance sheet data, we provide a micro-econometric analysis of the
fall in Belgian imports and exports before and during the 2008{2009 trade collapse. A few
clear results emerge from our analysis. First, the overwhelming part of the trade collapse
occurred at the intensive margin and is due to a fall in average quantities and unit prices.
Entry into foreign markets showed remarkable stability. Interestingly there was no massive
exit, hinting at the existence of large sunk costs of entering foreign markets (Roberts and
Tybout, 1997): large sunk entry costs create an option value of remaining an exporter or an
importer during the crisis. In addition, exporters' resilience suggests that trade will bounce
back quickly as the macroeconomic environment returns to normal: in fact Belgian trade
recovered its pre-collapse monthly level as early as in April 2010. These results concur with
previous analyses of trade during the Asian crisis (Bernard et al., 2009), but are nonetheless
remarkable given the magnitude of this trade collapse.
Second, we nd overall only little support for supply-side based explanations of the trade
collapse. On the one hand, GDP growth of the destination countries is the single most
important determinant of exports in our econometric analysis, explaining up to 57% of the fall
in exports and 47% of the fall in imports. This applies particularly to the demand for durable
goods and capital goods: trade in these categories fell systematically more, with a greater
elasticity to GDP. While studies using more aggregated data (Baldwin, 2009) or calibrated
simulations (Eaton et al., 2010) reach qualitatively and quantitatively similar conclusions, we
are not aware of any other rm-level analysis conrming these results to date. On the other
hand, few rm- or product-level characteristics are systematically related to the fall in trade,
especially when compared with the fall in domestic operations. For instance, access to credit
(as proxied by nancial balance sheet variables) can explain about 30% of the fall in exports,
but has no explanatory power regarding exports-to-turnover ratios. In other words, nancial
constraints aected foreign and domestic operations equally. Similarly involvement in global
value chains, as measured by the share of imported intermediates or export intensity, explains
quantitatively some of the collapse of imports, but has little explanatory power on imports-to
intermediate ratios. More generally exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates ratios
did not show any strong systematic correlation with other rm characteristics, nor did they
follow any general downward trend. If there was a recent increase in trade frictions due to
protectionism, it had no sizable eect on Belgian trade.
Of course, more research is needed to investigate the causes of the disproportionate fall
in the demand for tradable goods. Candidate explanations involve deferred consumption of
durables due to precautionary motives, substitution patterns among consumers with non-
homothetic preferences, or a bias towards non-tradables in scal stimuli packages. Such
investigations, while fundamental to our understanding of the crisis, are beyond the scope of
the present paper.
21Third, some of our ndings raise other questions for future research. For instance, sales
of entrants and exiters in 2009S1 are dramatically lower than those of the previous cohorts
in 2008S1, while the same is not true of stayers. This fact is at odds with the Melitz (2003)
model and would deserve further investigation in relation to recent dynamic export models.
The large increase in the number of importers despite the large fall in imports would also be
worthy of investigation.
Last, let us point out two caveats of our analysis. As we acknowledged, one dimension of
the extensive margin that we cannot control for is the number of trading partners a rm has
for each product-market combination. Our prediction that trade will bounce back quickly is
conditional on the hypothesis that this margin has not been strongly aected by the current
trade collapse. Also, we do not know to what extent our results generalize to other countries.
Developing countries might be much more severely aected by the credit crunch and the
drying up of trade credit (Berman and Martin, 2009). This would cause a higher trade fall at
the extensive margin there, and make a quick recovery less likely. Furthermore, implicit trade
barriers might have risen more in some pairs of countries than in others (Jacks et al., 2009;
Eaton et al., 2010). More research involving micro-data from other countries is thus certainly
called for in the future.
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Balance sheet data and rm-level variables. Firm-level variables are constructed from
2006 and 2007 balance sheet data from the Business Registry covering the population of rms
required to le their (unconsolidated) accounts to the National Bank of Belgium (nbb). The
data combine annual accounts with data from the Crossroads Bank on rms' main sector,
24activity and legal status. Overall, most rms that are registered in Belgium (i.e., that exist
as a separate legal entity) and have limited liability are required to le annual accounts.25
Specically, all limited-liability rms that are incorporated in Belgium have to report uncon-
solidated accounts involving balance sheet items and income statements. Belgian rms that
are in addition part of a group also have to submit consolidated accounts where they report
the joint group's activities in a consolidated way. However, Belgian aliates of a foreign
group which do not exist as a separate legal entity in Belgium are not required to report
unconsolidated accounts (they are required to le a consolidated account, but these data do
not allow us to obtain rm-level characteristics for the Belgian aliate). There are two types
of annual accounts: full and abbreviated. Firms have to le a full annual account when they
exceed at least two of the three following cutos: (i) employ at least 50 employees; (ii) have
an annual turnover of more than 7.3 million euros; and (iii) report total assets of more than
3.65 million euros.
For the 2008S1-2009S1 (2007S1-2008S1) analysis, we selected those companies that either
led a full or an abbreviated balance sheet in 2007 (2006) while reporting at least one employee.
Annualized balance sheets provide us with information on the (full-time equivalent) number of
employees, operating prots, equity and liability values, the amount of liabilities due after or
within one year, the amount of liabilities held by nancial institutions or commercial parties,
the values of intermediate stocks, and the NACE rev1.1 5-digit code of the rm. Data on rm
turnover, value added, purchased intermediates, and investments in 2006 and 2007 come from
mandatory VAT declarations provided by the nbb. Balance sheets also record information on
these four variables, but we prefer to use VAT declarations as information is more accurate
and virtually covers the universe of Belgian rms. Multinational status and foreign ownership
of a rm come from the yearly Survey of Foreign Direct Investments carried out by the
nbb. Finally, rm-level imports and exports, which are needed to construct some rm-level
controls, refer to the same year of the balance sheet information. Data have been obtained
by aggregating rm-product-country level transaction values in the trade database over the
entire year at the rm level.
Trade and production data. Import and export data by rm, product, and country
for Belgium is collected by the nbb on a monthly basis. More precisely, the information
comes from intra-EU (Intrastat) and extra-EU (Extrastat) trade declarations that cover the
universe of trade transactions.26 Firm and trade data were merged using the VAT number
which identies each rm in Belgium. The data is extremely rich and comparable in quality
25Exceptions include: sole traders; small companies whose members have unlimited liability; general partner-
ships; ordinary limited partnerships; cooperative limited liability companies; large companies whose members
have unlimited liability, if none of the members is a legal entity; public utilities; agricultural partnerships;
hospitals, unless they have taken the form of a trading company with limited liability; health insurance funds;
professional associations; schools and higher education institutions.
26For intra-EU trade, the thresholds above which a legal obligation to declare arises are relatively small.
In addition rms often provide information about their trade even when they are below the thresholds. For
Extra-EU trade data are exhaustive for trade ows over 1,000 euros or 1,000 kilograms.
25to the widely known French Customs data used by, e.g., Eaton et al. (2004). Imports and
exports of each rm are recorded in current euros at the 8-digit CN level27 by country of
origin/destination. Information on either the number of units or the weight in kilograms (or
sometimes both) of traded goods is available and is product specic. Weight is the most
widely used quantity unit.
In order to construct the quantity index used in Tables 4 to 10 we have use a `mixed
quantity' unit corresponding to kilograms, whenever recorded, and to units for those products
recorded in units only. We then compute the average mixed quantity value across all rm-
country-product transactions involved in the group considered (example: exports of small
rms) separately for 2008 and 2009. We dene the average price as the ratio of the average
value of trade transactions across all rm-country-products involved in the group considered
and the average mixed quantity dened above. As long as the composition of trade is stable
across goods recorded in kilograms and in units, our indicators are informative about average
changes in prices and quantities traded. To check robustness, we have also computed a
quantity and a price index following the same methodology described above while considering
only trade registered in kilograms. Results are very similar in terms of price and quantity
changes between 2008S1 and 2009S1.
Finally, monthly production data by Prodcom-2008 2-digit codes are provided by the
Belgian National Institute of Statistics. Data are based on mandatory declarations by a
sample of about 8,000 rms representing the largest manufacturing producers in Belgium.
Once anonymized, data are then made available for dierent levels of aggregation under the
Prodcom database brand. Some goods, especially those referring to agriculture and shery,
are not included in the data.
Country and product data. Exchange rate variations between 2008S1 and 2009S1 (as
well as between 2007S1 and 2008S1) refer to the change in the nominal interbank exchange
rates with respect to the euro at noon on April 1st, as recorded by the Bank of Canada.
We choose April 1st as our midpoint in the rst semester of each year (April 2nd in 2007).
The average growth rate of GDP between 2008 and 2009 is the average of the two annual
growth rates of the GDP at constant prices and comes from the IMF World Economic Outlook
database as of October 2009. A mirror denition applies to the average growth rate between
2007 and 2008. The product classication follows the EU's `Main Industrial Groupings' in
ocial statistics, as described in the European Commission Regulation No 586/2001 (March
26, 2001). This classication separates products into intermediate, capital, consumer durable,
consumer non-durable, and energy products. Some HS4 products (mainly agricultural goods)
cannot be assigned to one of these categories using the correspondence table provided by the
EU; we thus classify them as `Residual goods'. The product group `Intermediate, Capital, &
Durables' used in the paper refers to the grouping of intermediate, capital goods, and consumer
27The 8-digit Combined Nomenclature (CN) is the main product classication in the European Community.
It is an product-based classication that draws extensively on the Harmonized System (HS) nomenclature.
26durables. All remaining product categories are subsumed by the `Other Goods' group. The
measure of product dierentiation we use is based on the Rauch (1999) classication and
corresponds to the share of HS6 codes within an HS4 category that are neither sold on an
organized exchange nor referenced priced. We use the `liberal' classication.
B Additional margin decompositions of the trade collapse
To gauge whether the trade collapse visible in Tables 4 and 5 roughly aects all rms, sectors,
and trading partners equally, we split our sample more nely along various dimensions. In
particular, we address the following four questions:
(i) Is there a geographic pattern in the trade collapse and its dierent margins, i.e., are
Belgian trade margins behaving dierently across `regions'?
(ii) Are large or small, and more or less productive, rms aected dierently?
(iii) Does a rm's ownership status (foreign versus domestically owned) and its multina-
tional status matter?
(iv) Does a rm's debt structure in terms of overall leverage or nancial versus commercial
debt matter?
A detailed decomposition of changes in exports and imports at the dierent margins along
these dimensions can provide some rst insights into the key explanations of the sharp fall in
trade during the 2008S1{2009S1 trade collapse. In particular, item (i) provides information
about geographic shifts in trade ows, while items (iii){(v) provide information about reallo-
cation of market shares across rms, the collapse of global value chains, and the importance
of access to credit.
In what follows, we present results for exports and imports separately.28 Table 7 decom-
poses the margins of Belgian exports to EU member states, to OECD non-EU countries, and
to non-OECD non-EU countries, respectively. As can be seen, total export changes are very
similar across the three country groups. The single most important insight is, as in Tables
4 and 5, the overwhelming contribution of the intensive margin to the trade collapse. There
is not much change in terms of entry or exit and in terms of the average number of partner
countries. Furthermore, while there is some mild evidence of product adding for exports to
non-EU countries, the overall impact on exports is rather limited. In all three cases, the fall
in the intensive margin amounts to about 25{30% meaning that the small dierences in the
total export decrease across regions is due to the extensive margin.29
28We present only the most signicant results and briey comment on others. The full set of results is
available as a spreadsheet from the authors upon request.
29In an unreported robustness check (available upon request) we also provide an alternative price-quantity
decomposition where we only focus on goods which are reported by weight. Results slightly dier from those
reported in the paper. The reasons are that: (i) the total trade of goods that are measured in kilograms has
decreased less than the trade of goods measures in units; and (ii) Belgium trades proportionally more goods
measured in kilograms with non-EU countries.
27Insert Table 7 about here.
Recall that the change in the extensive margin for total Belgian exports in Table 4 amounts
to about 2.68% of the total trade fall. As shown by Table 7, this aggregate gure masks
some regional variation. Indeed, the extensive margin falls and contributes more (5.62%) for
exports to EU member states, whereas it increases for exports to OECD non-EU countries
and for exports to non-OECD non-EU countries thereby reducing the trade fall by 11.43%
and 0.2% respectively. Bearing in mind that such gures are small, cross-regional dierences
in the response of the extensive margin might be explained by the fact that arm's length
transactions are relatively more common in the EU. Indeed Bernard et al. (2009) show, using
US data, that the extensive margin reacts more strongly to negative shocks for arm's length
than for related-party trade.
Results for imports closely mirror those for exports and are therefore not reported in
detail. Imports from EU member states dropped by 28.88%, whereas imports from OECD
non-EU countries and for imports from non-OECD non-EU countries dropped by 24.24% and
by 24.71%, respectively. The contribution of the intensive margin remains extremely high in
all cases, with 90.68%, 131.05% and 131.31%, respectively. The overall positive contribution
of the extensive margin of 1.79% given by Table 5 is due to a positive contribution of 9.31% to
the drop of imports from EU member states and a negative contribution (i.e. an increase in
the extensive margin counterbalancing the fall) of -31.05% for imports from OECD non-EU
countries and -31.31% for imports from non-OECD non-EU countries.
Insert Table 8 about here.
Table 8 summarizes the changes in export and import margins for small and for large rms.
We dene size in terms of employment and small rms as those being below the 2-digit NACE
rev1.1 industry median size across all trading rms.30 Large rms are dened analogously.
As can be seen from the top part of Table 8, larger rms see their exports fall relatively more
on average, although the dierences are modest.31 The gap is wider in the case of imports:
imports of small rms decrease by 12:80%, while imports of large rms decrease by 30:46%.
Again, the fall of both exports and imports occurs primarily at the intensive margin. We
also decomposed the margins between low and high productivity rms (dened again as rms
below or above the industry median across trading rm) with productivity being measured as
value added per worker. Results are fairly similar. Low productivity rms saw their exports
and imports fall by  16:51% and  17:87%, respectively, whereas the corresponding gures
for high productivity rms are  28:56% and  31:29%. It is important to stress that these
ndings challenge the view that larger and more productive rms are better equipped to
30Some exporters and importers are lost because of the lack of balance sheet data which is required for gures
on employment and other rm characteristics. The same issue applies to Tables 9 and 10. See Appendix A for
further details.
31Those results are consistent with those of Bricongne et al. (2009) for French rms.
28overcome adverse market shocks. To the extent that market participation and trade volumes
are proxies for `success' during a crisis, our results suggests that small and less productive
rms are relative `winners'.
Insert Table 9 about here.
Table 9 decomposes the margins of changes in imports across multinational and non-
multinational, as well as across foreign owned versus non-foreign owned rms.32 The dierence
between the various types of rms occurs essentially at the intensive margin: rms with
international ownership structures (multinationals and foreign-owned rms) reduced their
import values substantially more, both along the quantity and the price margins. Note that
changes in the latter margin could be explained by either the composition of multinational
trade, or by changes in how multinationals record related-party transactions (transfer pricing).
We have no information on the latter aspect. Results for exports look very similar and are
not reported here.
Insert Table 10 about here.
Finally, Table 10 shows that there are no substantial dierences in the changes at the
various margins for Belgian exporters according to the size and structure of their debt. Al-
though rms with larger debt-to-liabilities ratios or with a larger share of nancial (as op-
posed to commercial) debts experienced slightly larger declines in exports (essentially because
of slightly more exit in this case), they seem to be aected in roughly similar ways. Results
using the share of long-term debt in rms' overall debt (not reported here) yield a similar
picture. We also decomposed the import margins along the debt dimension, with very sim-
ilar results. For example, low debt-to-liabilities importers contracted on average by 28.43%
(against 24.53% for exporters), while high debt-to-liabilities importers contracted on average
by 29.89% (against 29.72% for exporters). The decomposition of margins, while not identical,
remains qualitatively very similar.
32A multinational rm is a rm that is registered in Belgium and which owns, either directly or indirectly,
more than 10% of the equity of at least one rm registered in another country. A foreign-owned rm is a rm
that is registered in Belgium and the equity of which is, either directly or indirectly, owned (partially or in
total) by one or more rms registered in another country, with each owing at least 10% of the equity of the
Belgian rm.
29C Baseline Tables and Figures
Table 1: Percentage changes in exports and imports by broad product category (2008S1-2009S1).
Product category Change in Exports (%) Change in Imports (%)
Consumer non-durables -8.48 -4.95
Intermediates -30.39 -30.94
Capital goods -23.25 -23.62
Consumer durables -38.03 -39.17
Energy -43.50 -44.18
Residual -24.04 -16.23
Notes: See Appendix A for further details on product categories.
Table 2: % changes in exports, imports, export/production, and import/production ratios by product
(2008S1-2009S1).
Prodcom-2008 product name % Export Exp./Prod. Exp./Prod. % Imp. Imp./Prod. Imp./Prod.
change ratio 2008S1 ratio 2009S1 change ratio 2008S1 ratio 2009S1
Other mining and quarrying -48.20 10.16 6.39 -49.23 10.91 6.73
Mfg of food products -3.61 0.80 0.81 -6.67 0.59 0.58
Mfg of beverages -21.41 0.71 0.56 -25.78 0.70 0.52
Mfg of tobacco products -11.78 0.84 0.80 -1.17 0.76 0.82
Mfg of textiles -26.39 1.01 1.04 -22.09 0.48 0.52
Mfg of wearing apparel -20.10 16.53 17.50 -7.79 24.37 29.77
Mfg of leather and related products -19.82 11.39 12.13 -9.91 15.57 18.62
Mfg of wood, products of wood -31.15 0.72 0.66 -24.76 0.64 0.65
Mfg of paper and paper products -17.89 0.87 0.84 -14.60 0.86 0.87
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 74.70 0.05 0.10 50.75 0.05 0.09
Mfg of chemicals and chemical products -30.18 0.97 1.03 -34.49 0.72 0.72
Mfg of basic pharmaceutical products 2.43 1.21 1.22 26.95 0.73 0.91
Mfg of rubber and plastic products -22.39 1.27 1.21 -20.91 1.10 1.06
Mfg of other non-metallic mineral products -25.24 0.60 0.54 -22.17 0.41 0.39
Mfg of basic metals -46.44 0.89 0.92 -45.65 0.58 0.62
Mfg of fabric. metal products, -20.91 0.52 0.52 -23.65 0.58 0.57
Mfg of computer, electronic and optical products -17.93 3.38 3.74 -13.29 4.97 5.82
Mfg of electrical equipment -18.46 1.08 1.11 -17.15 1.31 1.36
Mfg of machinery and equipment n. e. c. -27.27 1.52 1.52 -30.18 1.65 1.57
Mfg of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers -32.59 1.08 1.12 -27.09 1.27 1.43
Mfg of other transport equipment 15.21 1.05 1.36 -10.09 1.21 1.22
Mfg of furniture -18.85 0.73 0.67 -15.49 1.13 1.07
Other manufacturing -3.75 9.25 10.14 -9.23 9.58 9.90
Repair and installation of machinery -22.20 0.03 0.03 -3.19 0.07 0.07
Total -25.15 0.96 0.95 -24.08 1.04 1.02
Notes: See Appendix A for further details. The gures for changes in total exports and imports slightly dier from those provided
in the text because the data in the table do not include some product categories, such as agricultural goods, that do not belong to
the Prodcom classication.
30Table 3: % changes in exports plus imports by country for the top-100 Belgian trading partners.
Country Rank % Trade change Country Rank % Trade change Country Rank % Trade change
NL 1 -31.83 AU 35 8.48 CY 69 -35.05
DE 2 -25.16 SA 36 -8.51 EC 70 15.35
FR 3 -25.31 RO 37 -28.39 LV 71 -42.00
GB 4 -27.47 EG 38 -53.49 PE 72 -37.83
IT 5 -26.87 TH 39 -16.16 BY 73 -18.36
US 6 -24.95 QA 40 35.67 LB 74 -1.65
ES 7 -25.68 MX 41 -11.40 CM 75 -4.22
LU 8 -31.10 ID 42 -12.77 GH 76 -18.40
SE 9 -41.33 MA 43 -31.07 CI 77 -2.92
IN 10 -32.49 TW 44 -14.58 SN 78 -49.34
CN 11 0.17 DZ 45 -1.61 SY 79 -16.80
JP 12 -23.78 UA 46 -37.26 SR 80 29.04
RU 13 -48.98 CD 47 -44.41 LY 81 14.89
PL 14 -23.40 VN 48 -31.80 DO 82 -50.12
NO 15 -39.12 AR 49 -36.59 JO 83 19.55
CH 16 -17.45 SG 50 -17.06 LS 84 -20.78
IL 17 -58.66 MY 51 -20.06 KW 85 21.52
TR 18 -33.78 SI 52 -21.13 LK 86 -22.96
CZ 19 -20.87 TN 53 -14.73 IS 87 -26.81
AT 20 -22.34 LT 54 -16.11 NC 88 -23.43
AE 21 -40.51 VE 55 -44.57 KE 89 -16.37
DK 22 -25.31 MH 56 -99.99 ZM 90 -28.98
KR 23 -36.82 IR 57 -22.45 CG 91 -24.93
BR 24 -34.73 PH 58 -31.52 GN 92 -6.82
IE 25 21.50 NZ 59 -2.26 MT 93 -22.05
FI 26 -25.84 NG 60 -32.34 SL 94 -39.26
PT 27 -25.03 AO 61 12.90 MR 95 -66.38
HK 28 -9.84 CL 62 36.79 HN 96 -22.24
CA 29 -21.86 PK 63 -8.21 BF 97 22.24
HU 30 -25.83 CO 64 12.48 KZ 98 -10.38
ZA 31 -25.33 BD 65 8.31 MK 99 -57.05
GR 32 -31.16 EE 66 -32.95 BJ 100 -21.04
BG 33 -46.43 HR 67 -37.08
SK 34 -23.24 CR 68 -9.35
Notes: Country codes are ginve in the ISO2 format. Countries are ranked according to their total trade with
Belgium in the rst semester of 2008.
Table 4: Changes in the margins of Belgian exports (2008S1{2009S1).
Total exports (all rm-country-product combinations)
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008S1 101.25 18,053 6.62 5.58 151,844 115,277 1.32
2009 S1 74.69 18,227 6.49 5.59 112,925 92,221 1.22
(   1)% -26.23 0.96 -1.92 0.16 -25.63 -20.00 -7.04
Margin's contribution 2.68% 97.32%
Notes: Total exports are given in billion euros while average sales are given in euros. See Appendix A
for further details.
Table 5: Changes in the margins of Belgian imports (2008S1{2009S1).
Total imports (all rm-country-product combinations)
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008 S1 106.10 31,497 3.88 7.02 123,681 118,747 1.04
2009 S1 76.64 33,576 3.74 6.78 89,855 98,089 0.92
(   1)% -27.77 6.60 -3.54 -3.32 -27.35 -17.40 -12.05
Margin's contribution 1.79% 98.21%
Notes: Total imports are given in billion euros while average sales are given in euros. See Appendix A
for further details.
31Table 6: Changes in the margins of Belgian trade in `Intermediate, Capital, & Durables' vs `Other
goods' (2008S1{2009S1).
Exports of goods classied as `Other goods'
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008 S1 34.98 8,925 4.40 5.80 153,589 108,005 1.42
2009 S1 27.63 9,022 4.34 5.77 122,267 95,809 1.28
(   1)% -21.03 1.09 -1.35 -0.52 -20.39 -11.29 -10.26
Margin's contribution 3.39% 96.61%
Exports of goods classied as `Intermediate, Capital, & Durables'
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008 S1 66.27 14,439 5.56 5.47 150,938 119,049 1.27
2009 S1 47.06 14,630 5.41 5.50 108,076 90,359 1.20
(   1)% -28.98 1.32 -2.60 0.50 -28.40 -24.10 -5.66
Margin's contribution 2.40% 97.60%
Imports of goods classied as `Other goods'
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008 S1 41.94 20,464 2.08 7.69 128,461 148,381 0.87
2009 S1 31.19 21,777 2.03 7.38 95,314 132,022 0.72
(   1)% -25.64 6.42 -1.94 -3.96 -25.80 -11.02 -16.61
Margin's contribution -0.77% 100.77%
Imports of goods classied as `Intermediate, Capital, & Durables'
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008 S1 64.16 24,810 3.22 6.66 120,743 100,538 1.20
2009 S1 45.45 26,141 3.11 6.46 86,457 76,965 1.12
(   1)% -29.17 5.36 -3.18 -3.03 -28.40 -23.45 -6.46
Margin's contribution 3.14% 96.86%
Notes: Total exports (imports) are given in billion euros while average sales are given in euros. See
Appendix A for further details.
32Table 7: Changes in the margins of Belgian exports across `regions' (2008S1{2009S1).
Exports to EU member states only
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008S1 77.90 7,544 7.70 8.16 164,348 139,639 1.18
2009 S1 57.60 7,652 7.46 8.16 123,602 112,781 1.10
(   1)% -26.06 1.43 -3.07 0.00 -24.79 -19.23 -6.88
Margin's contribution 5.62% 94.38%
Exports to OECD non-EU countries
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008 S1 9.55 8,457 2.17 3.59 145,205 76,032 1.91
2009 S1 6.90 8,569 2.13 3.74 101,162 49,465 2.05
(   1)% -27.70 1.32 -1.68 4.18 -30.33 -34.94 7.09
Margin's contribution -11.43% 111.43%
Exports to non-OECD non-EU countries
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008 S1 13.81 10,923 3.94 2.95 108,641 44,719 2.43
2009 S1 10.19 10,997 3.91 2.96 80,105 39,816 2.01
(   1)% -26.22 0.68 -0.93 0.32 -26.27 -10.96 -17.19
Margin's contribution -0.20% 100.20%
Notes: Total exports are given in billion euros while average sales are given in euros. See Appendix A
for further details.
Table 8: Changes in the margins of Belgian trade for large and small rms (2008S1{2009S1).
Exports by small rms
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008 S1 4.80 5,318 4.23 2.75 77,522 95,637 0.81
2009 S1 3.82 5,188 4.28 2.82 61,031 72,719 0.84
(   1)% -20.52% -2.44% 1.14% 2.31% -21.27% -23.96% 3.54%
Margin's contribution -4.13% 104.13%
Exports by large rms
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008S1 77.41 7,465 10.4352 6.21 159,929 128,679 1.24
2009 S1 56.24 7,519 10.1366 6.43 114,783 98,515 1.17
(   1)% -27,35% 0.72% -2.86% 3.46% -28.23% -23.44% -6.25%
Margin's contribution -3.82% 103.82%
Imports by small rms
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008 S1 5.49 9,342 3.01 4.62 42,230 75,866 0.56
2009 S1 4.79 9,483 3.02 4.59 36,386 68,043 0.53
(   1)% -12.80% 1.51% 0.30% -0.59% -13.84% -10.31% -3.93%
Margin's contribution -8.76% 108.76%
Imports by large rms
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008 S1 82.12 11,570 6.30 8.42 133,884 129,900 1.03
2009 S1 57.11 11,642 6.21 8.25 95,778 108,497 0.88
(   1)% -30.46% 0.62% -1.40% -2.02% -28.46% -16.48% -14.35%
Margin's contribution 7.79% 92.21%
Notes: Total exports (imports) are in billion euros while average sales are in euros. See Appendix
A for further details.
33Table 9: Changes in the margins of imports according to ownership structure (2008S1{2009S1).
Imports by non-multinational rms
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008S1 53.33 24,941 4.06 6.76 77,934 85,982 0.91
2009 S1 40.88 25,421 4.00 6.62 60,734 72,400 0.84
(   1)% -23.34% 1.92% -1.40% -2.12% -22.07% -15.80% -7.45%
Margin's contribution 6.17% 93.83%
Imports by multinational rms
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008S1 36.95 702 12.25 10.68 402,288 392,168 1.03
2009 S1 23.42 717 12.03 10.29 263,974 323,630 0.82
(   1)% -36.61% 2.14% -1.84% -3.64% -34.38% -17.48% -20.49%
Margin's contribution 7.58% 92.42%
Imports by non-foreign-owned rms
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008S1 35.71 24,297 3.97 6.51 56,815 70,084 0.81
2009S1 28.60 24,798 3.92 6.35 46,357 62,856 0,74
(   1)% -19.91% 2.06% -1.45% -2.41% -18.41% -10.31% -9.03%
Margin's contribution 8.35% 91.65%
Imports by foreign-owned rms
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Year Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008S1 54.57 1,346 9.82 11.17 369,749 344,253 1.07
2009S1 35.70 1,340 9.83 10.99 246,448 266,920 0.92
(   1)% -34.57% -0.45% 0.16% -1.55% -33.35% -22.46% -14.04%
Margin's contribution 4.36% 95.64%
Notes: Total imports are in billion euros while average sales are in euros. See Appendix A for further
details.
34Table 10: Changes in the margins of exports according to debt structure (2008S1{2009S1).
Exports by rms with low share of debts over liabilities
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Year Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008S1 45.16 7,651 7.57 5.52 141,146 116,985 1.21
2009S1 34.08 7,672 7.47 5.69 104,476 89,788 1.16
(   1)% -24.53% 0.27% -1.36% 3.08% -25.98% -23.25% -3.56%
Margin's contribution -6.91% 106.91%
Exports by rms with high share of debts over liabilities
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Year Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008S1 38.76 7,507 6.50 5.02 158,246 134,593 1.18
2009S1 27.24 7,391 6.43 5.06 113,401 105,279 1.08
(   1)% -29.72% -1.55% -1.06% 0.68% -28.34% -21.78% -8.39%
Margin's contribution 5.52% 94.48%
Exports by rms with low share of nancial debts
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Year Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008S1 39.85 7,580 6.71 5.10 153,370 117,823 1.30
2009S1 30.18 7,527 6.67 5.22 115,226 91,939 1.25
(   1)% -24.25% -0.70% -0.72% 2.27% -24.87% -21.97% -3.72%
Margin's contribution -2.95% 102.95%
Exports by rms with high share of nancial debts
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Year Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008S1 44.06 7,521 7.39 5.48 144,628 130,558 1.11
2009S1 31.12 7,467 7.29 5.59 102,356 100,255 1.02
(   1)% -29.36% -0.72% -1.44% 2.01% -29.23% -23.21% -7.84%
Margin's contribution 0.53% 99.47%
Notes: Total exports are in billion euros while average sales are in euros. See Appendix A for further
details.
Table 11: The dynamics of exports and imports.
2008S1{2009S1 trade dynamics
Exports Imports
Firm Type N of rms Trade share in N of rms Trade share in
2009S1 2008S1 2009S1 2008S1
Stayers 12,964 0.98 0.98 23,782 0.98 0.98
Entrants 5,263 0.02 0.00 9,794 0.02 0.00
Exiters 5,089 0.00 0.02 7,715 0.00 0.02
2007S1{2008S1 trade dynamics
Exports Imports
Firm Type N of rms Trade share in N of rms Trade share in
2008S1 2007S1 2008S1 2007S1
Stayers 12,481 0.92 0.92 21,209 0.92 0.98
Entrants 5,572 0.08 0.00 10,288 0.08 0.00
Exiters 4,662 0.00 0.08 4,543 0.00 0.02
Notes: See Appendix A for further details.
35Table 12: Changes in the margins of Belgian exports and imports across cohorts of stayers, entrants
and exiters.
Exports of Stayers
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Cohort Total Firms Countries Products Sales
2008S1 99.53 12,964 8.58 5.74 155,837
2009S1 72.85 12,964 8.46 5.86 113,256
(   1)% -26.81 0.00 -1.41 2.16 -27.32
Margin's contribution -2.28% 102.28%
Imports of Stayers
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Cohort Total Firms Countries Products Sales
2008S1 104.40 23,782 4.66 7.42 126,907
2009S1 74.74 23,782 4.68 7.27 92,463
(   1)% -28.41 0.00 0.33 -2.07 -27.14
Margin's contribution 5.26% 94.74%
Exports of Entrants
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Cohort Total Firms Countries Products Sales
2008S1 8.28 5,572 1.77 3.23 259,363
2009S1 1.83 5,263 1.64 2.11 101,183
(   1)% -77.83 -5.55 -7.67 -34.84 -60.99
Margin's contribution 37.52% 62.48%
Imports of Entrants
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Cohort Total Firms Countries Products Sales
2008S1 8.08 10,288 1.61 3.61 134,753
2009S1 1.90 9,794 1.48 3.09 42,590
(   1)% -76.49 -4.80 -8.45 -14.64 -68.39
Margin's contribution 20.43% 79.57%
Exports of Exiters
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Cohort Total Firms Countries Products Sales
2008S1 7.58 4,662 1.65 2.90 339,290
2009S1 1.72 5,089 1.61 3.43 61,090
(   1)% -77.36 9.16 -2.61 18.27 -81.99
Margin's contribution -8.76% 108.76%
Imports of Exiters
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Cohort Total Firms Countries Products Sales
2008S1 1.73 4,543 1.57 3.36 72,023
2009S1 1.70 7,715 1.47 3.10 48,358
(   1)% -1.35 69.82 -6.22 -7.74 -32.86
Margin's contribution -2,832.58% 2,932.58%
Notes: Total exports (imports) are given in billion euros while average sales
are given in euros. (   1)% refers to percentage dierence between cohorts:
2009S1 stayers exported 26.81% less in 2009S1 than did 2008S1 stayers in
2008S1. See Appendix A for further details.
36Table 13: Firm, country, and product regressors.
Variable name Description
Firm characteristics (2007 values)
Dsize size (in term of employment) of the rm
Dprod value added over workers
Dinterm share share of intermediates over turnover
Dshare exp sales share of exports over turnover
Dshare imp interm share of imports over intermediates
Dvalue add chain (exports*imports)/turnover
Dext fin dep (investments-operating prots)/investments
Dshare debts o liab share of debts over total liabilities
Dshare debts due after one share of debts due after one year
Dshare fin debt share of nancial debt.
Dshare stock share of stock over turnover
for foreign rm dummy
mne multinational dummy
s NACE rev1.1 2-digit dummies
Country characteristics
OECD NO EU dummy for country belonging to the OECD (in 2008) but not to the EU
NO OECD NO EU dummy for country neither belonging to the OECD nor to the EU
exch rate change % change in the nominal exchange rate with the euro between the
end of the rst quarter of 2008 (2007) and the end of the rst quarter of 2009 (2008)
growth rate GDP average annual growth rate of the country between 2008 (2007) and 2009 (2008)
Product characteristics
intermediates intermediate goods dummy
capital goods capital goods dummy
consumer durables durable consumer goods dummy
consumer non durables non-durable consumer goods dummy
energy energy related goods dummy
redidual goods not belonging to the previous categories
fraclib diff measure of product dierentiation (based on Rauch, 1999)
Notes: All rm characteristics prexed with a `D' are dummy variables that take value one if the rm characteristic
is above the NACE rev 1.1 2-digit industry median across trading rms and zero otherwise. Data sources and the
denitions of variables are provided in Appendix A.
37Table 14: Exports and imports growth: rm, country, and product determinants.
2008S1{2009S1 2007S1{2008S1
Into the collapse Before the collapse
Coecient Exports Imports Exports Imports
growth growth growth growth
Firm characteristics
Dsize 0.0065 0.0286a 0.0371b 0.0218b
(0.023) (0.010) (0.018) (0.009)
Dprod 0.0007 -0.0034 0.0108 0.0391a
(0.020) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009)
Dinterm share -0.0162 -0.0208c 0.0032 0.0071
(0.023) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009)
Dshare exp sales -0.0326 -0.0380b -0.0087 0.0191
(0.046) (0.019) (0.022) (0.012)
Dshare imp interm 0.0100 -0.0263b -0.0511a -0.0280b
(0.023) (0.012) (0.019) (0.011)
Dvalue add chain 0.0160 -0.0505b 0.0309 -0.0507a
(0.042) (0.023) (0.026) (0.014)
Dext fin dep -0.0149 -0.0291a -0.0350 -0.0256b
(0.016) (0.010) (0.021) (0.012)
Dshare debts o liab -0.0345 -0.0121 -0.0168 -0.0055
(0.026) (0.012) (0.017) (0.010)
Dshare debts due after one 0.0560a 0.0199 0.0104 0.0097
(0.019) (0.013) (0.019) (0.012)
Dshare fin debt -0.0459b -0.0032 0.0209 0.0011
(0.023) (0.013) (0.021) (0.011)
Dshare stock 0.0338c -0.0131 0.0104 0.0113
(0.020) (0.013) (0.021) (0.010)
for -0.0263 0.0116 0.0181 0.0029
(0.031) (0.025) (0.025) (0.013)
mne -0.0141 0.0005 0.0114 -0.0304
(0.030) (0.024) (0.027) (0.023)
Country characteristics
OECD NO EU 0.1229a 0.1853a -0.1561a -0.2988a
(0.043) (0.026) (0.028) (0.036)
NO OECD NO EU 0.0271 0.1599a -0.0742b -0.2255a
(0.038) (0.038) (0.032) (0.041)
exch rate change -0.4654a -0.0525 -0.2885a -0.2988a
(0.092) (0.062) (0.064) (0.079)
growth rate GDP 0.0253a 0.0063 0.0138a 0.0056
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Product characteristics
intermediates -0.0359c -0.0580a 0.0126 -0.0246c
(0.019) (0.014) (0.018) (0.015)
capital goods -0.0801a -0.0610a -0.0055 -0.0393
(0.030) (0.016) (0.025) (0.031)
consumer durables -0.1306a -0.0873a -0.0171 -0.0305
(0.038) (0.020) (0.045) (0.022)
energy -0.0380 -0.0021 0.0944b -0.0409
(0.043) (0.040) (0.039) (0.065)
residual -0.0429 -0.0333b 0.0150 -0.0572b
(0.030) (0.014) (0.029) (0.025)
fraclib diff 0.0171 0.0242b -0.0347b -0.0255b
(0.020) (0.011) (0.017) (0.012)
Constant -0.2459b -0.0960 -0.0679 -0.0655
(0.110) (0.094) (0.073) (0.089)
NACE dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 204,598 255,035 196,029 251,079
R2 0.0091 0.0073 0.0044 0.0062
Notes: Multi-level clustered standard errors following Cameron et al. (2006) are
given in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
38Table 15: Correlation matrix of rm-level variables in the 2008S1-2009S1 export growth regression.
Dsize 1
Dprod 0.00 1
Dinterm share -0.01 -0.02 1
Dshare exp sales 0.10 0.10 0.00 1
Dshare imp interm 0.08 0.10 -0.12 0.20 1
Dvalue add chain 0.37 0.17 0.07 0.44 0.32 1
Dext fin dep -0.03 -0.34 0.11 -0.06 -0.07 -0.09 1
Dshare debts o liab -0.06 -0.10 0.15 -0.06 -0.01 -0.04 0.13 1
Dshare debts due after one 0.00 -0.11 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.16 0.22 1
Dshare fin debt 0.01 -0.08 -0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.13 0.26 0.52 1
Dshare stock -0.03 -0.08 -0.05 0.15 0.22 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.10 1
for 0.21 0.27 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.21 -0.16 -0.04 -0.20 -0.14 -0.13 1
mne 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.06 -0.03 0.19 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.07 0.43 1
Table 16: Firm-level export/turnover and imports/intermediates ratio change.
2008S1{2009S1 2007S1{2008S1
Into the collapse Before the collapse
Coecient Exports to Imports to Exports to Imports
Turnover Intermediates Turnover Intermediates
change change change change
Dsize -0.0084 -0.0357c 0.0936a 0.0502a
(0.035) (0.021) (0.032) (0.019)
Dprod 0.0032 0.0401b 0.0557c 0.0263
(0.033) (0.020) (0.030) (0.018)
Dinterm share 0.0293 -0.0127 0.0442 0.0583a
(0.030) (0.019) (0.027) (0.017)
Dshare exp sales -0.1478a 0.0541 -0.1290a -0.0116
(0.035) (0.037) (0.031) (0.030)
Dshare imp interm 0.0231 -0.1165a 0.0012 -0.0187
(0.034) (0.019) (0.029) (0.016)
Dvalue add chain -0.1006b -0.0744b -0.0561 0.0209
(0.042) (0.036) (0.036) (0.029)
Dext fin dep -0.0172 -0.0366c -0.0826a 0.0089
(0.033) (0.020) (0.029) (0.017)
Dshare debts o liab -0.0072 -0.0053 0.0225 -0.0110
(0.031) (0.019) (0.028) (0.017)
Dshare debts due after one -0.0058 -0.0041 0.0513c 0.0108
(0.032) (0.022) (0.030) (0.018)
Dshare fin debt -0.0389 0.0392c -0.0260 -0.0031
(0.032) (0.022) (0.030) (0.019)
Dshare stock 0.0267 0.0166 0.0372 0.0106
(0.029) (0.018) (0.027) (0.017)
for -0.0113 0.0923b -0.0986b -0.0360
(0.045) (0.040) (0.047) (0.030)
mne -0.0242 -0.0082 0.0813c 0.0350
(0.050) (0.042) (0.044) (0.036)
Constant 0.1234 -0.1582 -0.1278 -0.1051
(0.114) (0.120) (0.101) (0.065)
NACE dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,360 14,388 8,250 13,983
R2 0.0164 0.0115 0.0191 0.0078
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
39Figure 1: Monthly exports and imports (million euros).
Figure 2: Monthly export- and import-to-production value ratios. Export and Imports refer
only to those goods for which data on production is available from the Prodcom dataset.
40D Robustness checks
In this Appendix, we present additional estimation results for the export and import growth
analysis of Section 4, as well as for the exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates ratio
analysis of Section 5. We present results for two robustness checks: (i) no NACE industry
dummies; (ii) continuous rm-level variables. For the latter set of results, all variables are
analogous to those summarized in Table 13, except that the variables starting with C are now
measured in continuous form and no longer as a dummy with respect to the NACE rev 1.1 two-
digit sectoral median value of the characteristic among trading rms. To deal with outliers,
we trim the data at 1% by eliminating, for each continuous covariate, those observations lying
above (below) the 99.5 (0.5) percentile. We consider rm size and productivity in log.
Tables 17 and 18 summarize the results obtained without NACE dummies while Tables 19
and 20 show estimations with continuous rm-level variables. Results are mostly qualitatively
similar to those in the main text.
One dierence between estimation with binary and continuous rm-level variables per-
tains to the coecients of nancial characteristics. These coecients are signicant in the
former and insignicant in the latter. This dierence might be due to non-linear eects
of nancial covariates. Therefore our last robustness check introduces quadratic terms for
Cshare debts due after one and Cshare fin debt. Results (available upon request) show signicantly
positive and negative coecients for Cshare debts due after one and Cshare fin debt for the period
2008S1{2009S1, with square terms being signicant and of opposite sign. The same coe-
cients are not signicant for 2007S1{2008S1. We conclude that our ndings in regressions
with binary covariates are conrmed, although rms with very short maturities or very high
leverage somewhat behaved dierently.
41Table 17: Exports and imports growth: rm, country, and product determinants, no NACE dummies.
2008S1{2009S1 2007S1{2008S1
Into the collapse Before the collapse
Coecient Exports Imports Exports Imports
growth growth growth growth
Firm characteristics
Dsize 0.0013 0.0397a 0.0384b 0.0156c
(0.022) (0.009) (0.016) (0.008)
Dprod -0.0023 -0.0016 0.0108 0.0371a
(0.018) (0.011) (0.015) (0.008)
Dinterm share -0.0224 -0.0200c 0.0018 0.0058
(0.021) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009)
Dshare exp sales -0.0282 -0.0506a -0.0161 0.0237b
(0.037) (0.019) (0.021) (0.012)
Dshare imp interm 0.0017 -0.0269b -0.0517a -0.0264b
(0.021) (0.012) (0.018) (0.010)
Dvalue add chain 0.0419 -0.0545b 0.0322 -0.0483a
(0.037) (0.023) (0.023) (0.012)
Dext fin dep -0.0239 -0.0341a -0.0354c -0.0247b
(0.017) (0.010) (0.021) (0.010)
Dshare debts o liab -0.0452c -0.0195c -0.0193 -0.0040
(0.024) (0.011) (0.018) (0.009)
Dshare debts due after one 0.0505b 0.0178 0.0122 0.0079
(0.020) (0.013) (0.018) (0.012)
Dshare fin debt -0.0401c -0.0042 0.0212 0.0022
(0.022) (0.013) (0.020) (0.010)
Dshare stock 0.0296 -0.0148 0.0157 0.0148c
(0.021) (0.012) (0.020) (0.009)
for -0.0333 0.0001 0.0149 0.0093
(0.031) (0.025) (0.023) (0.013)
mne -0.0101 -0.0049 0.0132 -0.0237
(0.028) (0.024) (0.028) (0.021)
Country characteristics
OECD NO EU 0.1055b 0.1793a -0.1646a -0.3027a
(0.043) (0.022) (0.027) (0.034)
NO OECD NO EU 0.0132 0.1582a -0.0799a -0.2401a
(0.036) (0.037) (0.031) (0.040)
exch rate change -0.4931a -0.0669 -0.2896a -0.3128a
(0.093) (0.056) (0.061) (0.074)
growth rate GDP 0.0251a 0.0064c 0.0136a 0.0068c
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Product characteristics
intermediates -0.0790a -0.0977a -0.0016 -0.0192c
(0.017) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012)
capital goods -0.1002a -0.1024a -0.0088 -0.0243
(0.028) (0.015) (0.023) (0.022)
consumer durables -0.1449a -0.0991a -0.0262 -0.0277
(0.035) (0.019) (0.036) (0.018)
energy -0.0636 -0.0251 0.0873b -0.0312
(0.042) (0.026) (0.040) (0.050)
residual -0.0545c -0.0468a 0.0188 -0.0522b
(0.030) (0.013) (0.026) (0.022)
fraclib diff 0.0054 0.0238b -0.0503a -0.0355a
(0.018) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011)
Constant -0.0776c -0.0630a -0.0243 0.0372c
(0.045) (0.022) (0.042) (0.023)
Observations 204,598 255,035 196,029 251,079
R2 0.0052 0.0048 0.0030 0.0052
Notes: Multi-level clustered standard errors following Cameron et al. (2006) are
given in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
42Table 18: Firm-level export/turnover and imports/intermediates ratio change, no NACE dummies.
2008S1{2009S1 2007S1{2008S1
Into the collapse Before the collapse
Coecient Exports to Imports to Exports to Imports
Turnover Intermediates Turnover Intermediates
change change change change
Dsize -0.0211 -0.0380c 0.1003a 0.0517a
(0.035) (0.021) (0.032) (0.019)
Dprod -0.0037 0.0373c 0.0536c 0.0280
(0.033) (0.020) (0.030) (0.018)
Dinterm share 0.0264 -0.0108 0.0385 0.0505a
(0.029) (0.019) (0.027) (0.016)
Dshare exp sales -0.1535a 0.0439 -0.1366a -0.0087
(0.035) (0.036) (0.031) (0.030)
Dshare imp interm 0.0403 -0.1107a 0.0057 -0.0192
(0.034) (0.019) (0.029) (0.016)
Dvalue add chain -0.0881b -0.0635c -0.0453 0.0235
(0.041) (0.035) (0.035) (0.029)
Dext fin dep -0.0167 -0.0374c -0.0867a 0.0081
(0.033) (0.020) (0.029) (0.017)
Dshare debts o liab -0.0074 -0.0050 0.0261 -0.0111
(0.031) (0.019) (0.028) (0.017)
Dshare debts due after one 0.0007 -0.0001 0.0511c 0.0071
(0.032) (0.022) (0.030) (0.019)
Dshare fin debt -0.0391 0.0404c -0.0221 -0.0028
(0.032) (0.022) (0.030) (0.019)
Dshare stock 0.0249 0.0145 0.0372 0.0115
(0.029) (0.018) (0.027) (0.016)
for 0.0242 0.0677c -0.1139b -0.0407
(0.043) (0.038) (0.047) (0.028)
mne -0.0120 -0.0151 0.0828c 0.0263
(0.049) (0.042) (0.044) (0.036)
Constant 0.1057b 0.0329 -0.0602 -0.1394a
(0.050) (0.033) (0.048) (0.028)
Observations 8,360 14,388 8,250 13,983
R2 0.0065 0.0046 0.0077 0.0018
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
43Table 19: Exports and imports growth: rm, country, and product determinants, continuous variables.
2008S1{2009S1 2007S1{2008S1
Into the collapse Before the collapse
Coecient Exports Imports Exports Imports
growth growth growth growth
Firm characteristics
Csize 0.0080 0.0103b 0.0258a 0.0043
(0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005)
Cprod 0.0100 0.0007 0.0251a 0.0244a
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004)
Cinterm share -0.0032 -0.0095c 0.0066 -0.0025
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006)
Cshare exp sales 0.0019 -0.0244a -0.0137b -0.0075
(0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Cshare imp interm 0.0070 -0.0119b -0.0099b -0.0149a
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Cvalue add chain -0.0084 -0.0086 -0.0040 -0.0052
(0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005)
Cext fin dep 0.0097c -0.0021 0.0047 0.0001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Cshare debts o liab -0.0027 -0.0078b 0.0002 -0.0002
(0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
Cshare debts due after one -0.0037 0.0093c -0.0028 0.0083
(0.011) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Cshare fin debt 0.0013 -0.0016 0.0090 -0.0059
(0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Cshare stock -0.0069 -0.0060 0.0076 0.0086b
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003)
for -0.0494 0.0190 -0.0226 -0.0185
(0.030) (0.024) (0.024) (0.018)
mne -0.0074 -0.0303 0.0195 -0.0311
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.023)
Country characteristics
OECD NO EU 0.1125a 0.1995a -0.1829a -0.2980a
(0.041) (0.021) (0.024) (0.035)
NO OECD NO EU 0.0030 0.1543a -0.0893a -0.2409a
(0.034) (0.042) (0.030) (0.033)
exch rate change -0.5017a -0.1273b -0.2999a -0.2709a
(0.109) (0.063) (0.076) (0.078)
growth rate GDP 0.0235a 0.0060 0.0143a 0.0070b
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Product characteristics
intermediates -0.0477b -0.0615a 0.0047 -0.0243c
(0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.013)
capital goods -0.1027a -0.0800a -0.0261 -0.0359
(0.026) (0.017) (0.026) (0.031)
consumer durables -0.1082a -0.0946a -0.0081 -0.0332
(0.036) (0.019) (0.044) (0.023)
energy -0.0700c 0.0411 0.0588 -0.0297
(0.042) (0.035) (0.064) (0.062)
residual -0.0317 -0.0531a -0.0007 -0.0535c
(0.025) (0.011) (0.029) (0.027)
fraclib diff 0.0083 0.0248b -0.0231 -0.0224c
(0.018) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012)
Constant -0.2309 -0.1376c -0.0076 0.2689a
(0.148) (0.075) (0.084) (0.078)
NACE dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 162,456 224,081 159,991 221,401
R2 0.0079 0.0070 0.0050 0.0059
Notes: Multi-level clustered standard errors following Cameron et al. (2006) are
given in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
44Table 20: Firm-level export/turnover and imports/intermediates ratio change, continuous variables.
2008S1{2009S1 2007S1{2008S1
Into the collapse Before the collapse
Coecient Exports to Imports to Exports to Imports
Turnover Intermediates Turnover Intermediates
change change change change
Csize -0.0349b -0.0220c 0.0295c 0.0190
(0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
Cprod -0.0034 0.0291b 0.0336b 0.0030
(0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012)
Cinterm share -0.0167 -0.0189 0.0200 0.0598a
(0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013)
Cshare exp sales -0.0663a 0.0024 -0.0584a 0.0118
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010)
Cshare imp interm -0.0054 -0.0690a -0.0113 -0.0153
(0.014) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011)
Cvalue add chain 0.0263a 0.0075 0.0079 -0.0066
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
Cext fin dep -0.0055 -0.0043 -0.0050 0.0012
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
Cshare debts o liab -0.0184 0.0009 -0.0081 -0.0128
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012)
Cshare debts due after one 0.0138 0.0002 0.0267c 0.0233c
(0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013)
Cshare fin debt -0.0165 0.0052 -0.0116 -0.0089
(0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
Cshare stock 0.0051 0.0298b 0.0018 -0.0236c
(0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
for -0.0480 0.1036b -0.1018b -0.0537
(0.038) (0.043) (0.040) (0.036)
mne -0.0081 0.0309 0.0286 0.0302
(0.036) (0.040) (0.042) (0.045)
Constant 0.2500c 0.1147 0.0185 -0.2267b
(0.128) (0.134) (0.122) (0.100)
NACE dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,886 13,694 7,785 13,307
R2 0.0166 0.0134 0.0169 0.0107
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
45NBB WORKING PAPER No. 195 - SEPTEMBER 2010    47 
NATIONAL BANK OF BELGIUM - WORKING PAPERS SERIES 
 
1.   "Model-based inflation forecasts and monetary policy rules", by M. Dombrecht and R. Wouters, Research 
Series, February 2000. 
2.   "The use of robust estimators as measures of core inflation", by L.  Aucremanne, Research Series, 
February 2000. 
3.  "Performances économiques des Etats-Unis dans les années nonante", by A. Nyssens, P. Butzen and 
P. Bisciari, Document Series, March 2000. 
4.  "A model with explicit expectations for Belgium", by P. Jeanfils, Research Series, March 2000. 
5.   "Growth in an open economy: Some recent developments", by S.  Turnovsky, Research Series, May 
2000. 
6.  "Knowledge, technology and economic growth: An OECD perspective", by I.  Visco, A.  Bassanini and 
S. Scarpetta, Research Series, May 2000. 
7.  "Fiscal policy and growth in the context of European integration", by P. Masson, Research Series, May 
2000. 
8.  "Economic growth and the labour market: Europe's challenge", by C.  Wyplosz, Research Series, May 
2000. 
9.  "The role of the exchange rate in economic growth: A euro-zone perspective", by R.  MacDonald, 
Research Series, May 2000. 
10.  "Monetary union and economic growth", by J. Vickers, Research Series, May 2000. 
11.  "Politique monétaire et prix des actifs: le cas des États-Unis", by Q. Wibaut, Document Series, August 
2000. 
12.  "The Belgian industrial confidence indicator: Leading indicator of economic activity in the euro area?", by 
J.-J. Vanhaelen, L. Dresse and J. De Mulder, Document Series, November 2000. 
13.  "Le financement des entreprises par capital-risque",  by C. Rigo, Document Series, February 2001. 
14.  "La nouvelle économie" by P. Bisciari, Document Series, March 2001. 
15.  "De kostprijs van bankkredieten", by A. Bruggeman and R. Wouters, Document Series, April 2001. 
16.  "A guided tour of the world of rational expectations models and optimal policies", by Ph.  Jeanfils, 
Research Series, May 2001. 
17.  "Attractive prices and euro - Rounding effects on inflation", by L.  Aucremanne and D.  Cornille, 
Documents Series, November 2001. 
18.  "The interest rate and credit channels in Belgium: An investigation with micro-level firm data", by 
P. Butzen, C. Fuss and Ph. Vermeulen, Research series, December 2001. 
19.  "Openness, imperfect exchange rate pass-through and monetary policy", by F. Smets and R. Wouters, 
Research series, March 2002. 
20.  "Inflation, relative prices and nominal rigidities", by L. Aucremanne, G. Brys, M. Hubert, P. J. Rousseeuw 
and A. Struyf, Research series, April 2002. 
21.  "Lifting the burden: Fundamental tax reform and economic growth", by D. Jorgenson, Research series, 
May 2002. 
22.  "What do we know about investment under uncertainty?", by L. Trigeorgis, Research series, May 2002. 
23.  "Investment, uncertainty and irreversibility: Evidence from Belgian accounting data" by D.  Cassimon, 
P.-J. Engelen, H. Meersman and M. Van Wouwe, Research series, May 2002. 
24.  "The impact of uncertainty on investment plans", by P. Butzen, C. Fuss and Ph. Vermeulen, Research 
series, May 2002. 
25.  "Investment, protection, ownership, and the cost of capital", by Ch. P. Himmelberg, R. G. Hubbard and 
I. Love, Research series, May 2002. 
26.  "Finance, uncertainty and investment: Assessing the gains and losses of a generalised non-linear 
structural approach using Belgian panel data", by M. Gérard and F. Verschueren, Research series, May 
2002. 
27.  "Capital structure, firm liquidity and growth", by R. Anderson, Research series, May 2002. 
28.  "Structural modelling of investment and financial constraints: Where do we stand?", by J.-B. Chatelain, 
Research series, May 2002. 
29.  "Financing and investment interdependencies in unquoted Belgian companies: The role of venture 
capital", by S. Manigart, K. Baeyens, I. Verschueren, Research series, May 2002. 
30.  "Development path and capital structure of Belgian biotechnology firms", by V.  Bastin, A.  Corhay, 
G. Hübner and P.-A. Michel, Research series, May 2002. 
31.  "Governance as a source of managerial discipline", by J. Franks, Research series, May 2002. 
32.  "Financing constraints, fixed capital and R&D investment decisions of Belgian firms", by M.  Cincera, 
Research series, May 2002.   NBB WORKING PAPER No. 195 - SEPTEMBER 2010  48
33.   "Investment, R&D and liquidity constraints: A corporate governance approach to the Belgian evidence", 
by P. Van Cayseele, Research series, May 2002. 
34.  "On the origins of the Franco-German EMU controversies", by I. Maes, Research series, July 2002. 
35.  "An estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the euro area", by F.  Smets and 
R. Wouters, Research series, October 2002. 
36.  "The labour market and fiscal impact of labour tax reductions: The case of reduction of employers' social 
security contributions under a wage norm regime with automatic price indexing of wages", by 
K. Burggraeve and Ph. Du Caju, Research series, March 2003. 
37.  "Scope of asymmetries in the euro area", by S. Ide and Ph. Moës, Document series, March 2003. 
38.  "De autonijverheid in België: Het belang van het toeleveringsnetwerk rond de assemblage van 
personenauto's", by F. Coppens and G. van Gastel, Document series, June 2003. 
39.  "La consommation privée en Belgique", by B. Eugène, Ph. Jeanfils and B. Robert, Document series, 
June 2003. 
40.  "The process of European monetary integration: A comparison of the Belgian and Italian approaches", by 
I. Maes and L. Quaglia, Research series, August 2003. 
41.  "Stock market valuation in the United States", by P. Bisciari, A. Durré and A. Nyssens, Document series, 
November 2003. 
42.  "Modeling the term structure of interest rates: Where do we stand?", by K.  Maes, Research series, 
February 2004. 
43.  "Interbank exposures: An ampirical examination of system risk in the Belgian banking system", by 
H. Degryse and G. Nguyen, Research series, March 2004. 
44.  "How frequently do prices change? Evidence based on the micro data underlying the Belgian CPI", by 
L. Aucremanne and E. Dhyne, Research series, April 2004. 
45.  "Firms' investment decisions in response to demand and price uncertainty", by C.  Fuss and 
Ph. Vermeulen, Research series, April 2004. 
46.  "SMEs and bank lending relationships: The impact of mergers", by H.  Degryse, N.  Masschelein and 
J. Mitchell, Research series, May 2004. 
47.  "The determinants of pass-through of market conditions to bank retail interest rates in Belgium", by 
F. De Graeve, O. De Jonghe and R. Vander Vennet, Research series, May 2004. 
48.  "Sectoral vs.  country diversification benefits and downside risk", by M.  Emiris, Research series, 
May 2004. 
49.  "How does liquidity react to stress periods in a limit order market?", by H. Beltran, A. Durré and P. Giot, 
Research series, May 2004. 
50. "Financial consolidation and liquidity: Prudential regulation and/or competition policy?", by 
P. Van Cayseele, Research series, May 2004. 
51.  "Basel II and operational risk: Implications for risk measurement and management in the financial 
sector", by A. Chapelle, Y. Crama, G. Hübner and J.-P. Peters, Research series, May 2004. 
52.  "The efficiency and stability of banks and markets", by F. Allen, Research series, May 2004. 
53.  "Does financial liberalization spur growth?", by G.  Bekaert, C.R.  Harvey and C.  Lundblad, Research 
series, May 2004. 
54.  "Regulating financial conglomerates", by X. Freixas, G. Lóránth, A.D. Morrison and H.S. Shin, Research 
series, May 2004. 
55.  "Liquidity and financial market stability", by M. O'Hara, Research series, May 2004. 
56.  "Economisch belang van de Vlaamse zeehavens: Verslag 2002", by F.  Lagneaux, Document series, 
June 2004. 
57.  "Determinants of euro term structure of credit spreads", by A. Van Landschoot, Research series, July 
2004. 
58.  "Macroeconomic and monetary policy-making at the European Commission, from the Rome Treaties to 
the Hague Summit", by I. Maes, Research series, July 2004. 
59.  "Liberalisation of network industries: Is electricity an exception to the rule?", by F. Coppens and D. Vivet, 
Document series, September 2004. 
60.  "Forecasting with a Bayesian DSGE model: An application to the euro area", by F.  Smets and 
R. Wouters, Research series, September 2004. 
61.  "Comparing shocks and frictions in US and euro area business cycle: A Bayesian DSGE approach", by 
F. Smets and R. Wouters, Research series, October 2004. 
62.   "Voting on pensions: A survey", by G. de Walque, Research series, October 2004. 
63.  "Asymmetric growth and inflation developments in the acceding countries: A new assessment", by S. Ide 
and P. Moës, Research series, October 2004. 
64.  "Importance économique du Port Autonome de Liège: rapport 2002", by F. Lagneaux, Document series, 
November 2004. NBB WORKING PAPER No. 195 - SEPTEMBER 2010    49 
65.  "Price-setting behaviour in Belgium: What can be learned from an ad hoc survey", by L. Aucremanne and 
M. Druant, Research series, March 2005. 
66.  "Time-dependent versus state-dependent pricing: A panel data approach to the determinants of Belgian 
consumer price changes", by L. Aucremanne and E. Dhyne, Research series, April 2005. 
67.  "Indirect effects – A formal definition and degrees of dependency as an alternative to technical 
coefficients", by F. Coppens, Research series, May 2005. 
68.  "Noname – A new quarterly model for Belgium", by Ph. Jeanfils and K. Burggraeve, Research series, 
May 2005. 
69.  "Economic importance of the Flemish maritime ports: Report 2003", by F. Lagneaux, Document series, 
May 2005. 
70.  "Measuring inflation persistence: A structural time series approach", by M. Dossche and G. Everaert, 
Research series, June 2005. 
71.  "Financial intermediation theory and implications for the sources of value in structured finance markets", 
by J. Mitchell, Document series, July 2005. 
72.  "Liquidity risk in securities settlement", by J. Devriese and J. Mitchell, Research series, July 2005. 
73.  "An international analysis of earnings, stock prices and bond yields", by A. Durré and P. Giot, Research 
series, September 2005. 
74.  "Price setting in the euro area: Some stylized facts from Individual Consumer Price Data", by E. Dhyne, 
L. J. Álvarez, H. Le Bihan, G. Veronese, D. Dias, J. Hoffmann, N. Jonker, P. Lünnemann, F. Rumler and 
J. Vilmunen, Research series, September 2005. 
75.  "Importance économique du Port Autonome de Liège: rapport 2003", by F. Lagneaux, Document series, 
October 2005. 
76.  "The pricing behaviour of firms in the euro area: New survey evidence, by S.  Fabiani, M.  Druant, 
I.  Hernando,  C.  Kwapil,  B.  Landau,  C.  Loupias,  F.  Martins,  T.  Mathä,  R.  Sabbatini,  H.  Stahl  and 
A. Stokman, Research series, November 2005. 
77.  "Income uncertainty and aggregate consumption”, by L. Pozzi, Research series, November 2005. 
78.  "Crédits aux particuliers - Analyse des données de la Centrale des Crédits aux Particuliers", by 
H. De Doncker, Document series, January 2006. 
79.  "Is there a difference between solicited and unsolicited bank ratings and, if so, why?", by P. Van Roy, 
Research series, February 2006. 
80.  "A generalised dynamic factor model for the Belgian economy - Useful business cycle indicators and 
GDP growth forecasts", by Ch. Van Nieuwenhuyze, Research series, February 2006. 
81.  "Réduction linéaire de cotisations patronales à la sécurité sociale et financement alternatif", by 
Ph. Jeanfils, L. Van Meensel, Ph. Du Caju, Y. Saks, K. Buysse and K. Van Cauter, Document series, 
March 2006. 
82.  "The patterns and determinants of price setting in the Belgian industry", by D. Cornille and M. Dossche, 
Research series, May 2006. 
83.  "A multi-factor model for the valuation and risk management of demand deposits", by H. Dewachter, 
M. Lyrio and K. Maes, Research series, May 2006. 
84.  "The single European electricity market: A long road to convergence", by F.  Coppens and D.  Vivet, 
Document series, May 2006. 
85.  "Firm-specific production factors in a DSGE model with Taylor price setting", by G. de Walque, F. Smets 
and R. Wouters, Research series, June 2006. 
86.  "Economic importance of the Belgian ports: Flemish maritime ports and Liège port complex - Report 
2004", by F. Lagneaux, Document series, June 2006. 
87.  "The response of firms' investment and financing to adverse cash flow shocks: The role of bank 
relationships", by C. Fuss and Ph. Vermeulen, Research series, July 2006. 
88.  "The term structure of interest rates in a DSGE model", by M. Emiris, Research series, July 2006. 
89.  "The production function approach to the Belgian output gap, estimation of a multivariate structural time 
series model", by Ph. Moës, Research series, September 2006. 
90.  "Industry wage differentials, unobserved ability, and rent-sharing: Evidence from matched worker-firm 
data, 1995-2002", by R. Plasman, F. Rycx and I. Tojerow, Research series, October 2006. 
91.  "The dynamics of trade and competition", by N. Chen, J. Imbs and A. Scott, Research series, October 
2006. 
92.  "A New Keynesian model with unemployment", by O. Blanchard and J. Gali, Research series, October 
2006. 
93.  "Price and wage setting in an integrating Europe: Firm level evidence", by F. Abraham, J. Konings and 
S. Vanormelingen, Research series, October 2006. 
94.  "Simulation, estimation and welfare implications of monetary policies in a 3-country NOEM model", by 
J. Plasmans, T. Michalak and J. Fornero, Research series, October 2006.   NBB WORKING PAPER No. 195 - SEPTEMBER 2010  50
95.  "Inflation persistence and price-setting behaviour in the euro area: A summary of the Inflation 
Persistence Network evidence ", by F. Altissimo, M. Ehrmann and F. Smets, Research series, October 
2006. 
96.  "How wages change: Micro evidence from the International Wage Flexibility Project", by W.T. Dickens, 
L. Goette, E.L. Groshen, S. Holden, J. Messina, M.E. Schweitzer, J. Turunen and M. Ward, Research 
series, October 2006. 
97.  "Nominal wage rigidities in a new Keynesian model with frictional unemployment", by V.  Bodart, 
G. de  Walque, O. Pierrard, H.R. Sneessens and R. Wouters, Research series, October 2006. 
98.  "Dynamics on monetary policy in a fair wage model of the business cycle", by D.  De la Croix, 
G. de Walque and R. Wouters, Research series, October 2006. 
99.  "The kinked demand curve and price rigidity: Evidence from scanner data", by M. Dossche, F. Heylen 
and D. Van den Poel, Research series, October 2006. 
100. "Lumpy price adjustments: A microeconometric analysis", by E.  Dhyne, C.  Fuss, H.  Peseran and 
P. Sevestre, Research series, October 2006. 
101. "Reasons for wage rigidity in Germany", by W. Franz and F. Pfeiffer, Research series, October 2006. 
102. "Fiscal sustainability indicators and policy design in the face of ageing", by G. Langenus, Research 
series, October 2006. 
103. "Macroeconomic fluctuations and firm entry: Theory and evidence", by V.  Lewis, Research series, 
October 2006. 
104. "Exploring the CDS-bond basis", by J. De Wit, Research series, November 2006. 
105. "Sector concentration in loan portfolios and economic capital", by K. Düllmann and N. Masschelein, 
Research series, November 2006. 
106. "R&D in the Belgian pharmaceutical sector", by H. De Doncker, Document series, December 2006. 
107. "Importance et évolution des investissements directs en Belgique", by Ch. Piette, Document series, 
January 2007. 
108. "Investment-specific technology shocks and labor market frictions", by R. De Bock, Research series, 
February 2007. 
109. "Shocks and frictions in US business cycles: A Bayesian DSGE approach", by F. Smets and R. Wouters, 
Research series, February 2007. 
110. "Economic impact of port activity: A disaggregate analysis.  The case of Antwerp", by F.  Coppens, 
F.  Lagneaux,  H.  Meersman,  N.  Sellekaerts,  E.  Van  de  Voorde,  G.  van  Gastel,  Th.  Vanelslander, 
A. Verhetsel, Document series, February 2007. 
111.  "Price setting in the euro area: Some stylised facts from individual producer price data", by 
Ph. Vermeulen, D. Dias, M. Dossche, E. Gautier, I. Hernando, R. Sabbatini, H. Stahl, Research series, 
March 2007. 
112. "Assessing the gap between observed and perceived inflation in the euro area: Is the credibility of the 
HICP at stake?", by L. Aucremanne, M. Collin and Th. Stragier, Research series, April 2007. 
113. "The spread of Keynesian economics: A comparison of the Belgian and Italian experiences", by I. Maes, 
Research series, April 2007. 
114. "Imports and exports at the level of the firm: Evidence from Belgium", by M.  Muûls and M.  Pisu, 
Research series, May 2007. 
115. "Economic importance of the Belgian ports: Flemish maritime ports and Liège port complex - Report 
2005", by F. Lagneaux, Document series, May 2007. 
116. "Temporal distribution of price changes: Staggering in the large and synchronization in the small", by 
E. Dhyne and J. Konieczny, Research series, June 2007. 
117. "Can excess liquidity signal an asset price boom?", by A. Bruggeman, Research series, August 2007.  
118. "The performance of credit rating systems in the assessment of collateral used in Eurosystem monetary 
policy operations", by F. Coppens, F. González and G. Winkler, Research series, September 2007. 
119. "The determinants of stock and bond return comovements", by L. Baele, G. Bekaert and K. Inghelbrecht, 
Research series, October 2007. 
120. "Monitoring pro-cyclicality under the capital requirements directive: Preliminary concepts for developing a 
framework", by N. Masschelein, Document series, October 2007. 
121. "Dynamic order submission strategies with competition between a dealer market and a crossing 
network", by H. Degryse, M. Van Achter and G. Wuyts, Research series, November 2007. 
122. "The gas chain: Influence of its specificities on the liberalisation process", by C.  Swartenbroekx, 
Document series, November 2007. 
123. "Failure prediction models: Performance, disagreements, and internal rating systems", by J. Mitchell and 
P. Van Roy, Research series, December 2007. 
124. "Downward wage rigidity for different workers and firms: An evaluation for Belgium using the IWFP 
procedure", by Ph. Du Caju, C. Fuss and L. Wintr, Research series, December 2007. NBB WORKING PAPER No. 195 - SEPTEMBER 2010    51 
125. "Economic importance of Belgian transport logistics", by F. Lagneaux, Document series, January 2008. 
126. "Some evidence on late bidding in eBay auctions", by L. Wintr, Research series, January 2008. 
127. "How do firms adjust their wage bill in Belgium? A decomposition along the intensive and extensive 
margins", by C. Fuss, Research series, January 2008. 
128. "Exports and productivity – Comparable evidence for 14 countries", by The International Study Group on 
Exports and Productivity, Research series, February 2008. 
129. "Estimation of monetary policy preferences in a forward-looking model: A Bayesian approach", by 
P. Ilbas, Research series, March 2008. 
130. "Job creation, job destruction and firms' international trade involvement", by M. Pisu, Research series, 
March 2008. 
131. "Do survey indicators let us see the business cycle? A frequency decomposition", by L. Dresse and 
Ch. Van Nieuwenhuyze, Research series, March 2008. 
132. "Searching for additional sources of inflation persistence: The micro-price panel data approach", by 
R. Raciborski, Research series, April 2008. 
133. "Short-term forecasting of GDP using large monthly datasets - A pseudo real-time forecast evaluation 
exercise", by K. Barhoumi, S. Benk, R. Cristadoro, A. Den Reijer, A. Jakaitiene, P. Jelonek, A. Rua, 
G. Rünstler, K. Ruth and Ch. Van Nieuwenhuyze, Research series, June 2008. 
134. "Economic importance of the Belgian ports: Flemish maritime ports, Liège port complex and the port of 
Brussels - Report 2006", by S. Vennix, Document series, June 2008. 
135. "Imperfect exchange rate pass-through: The role of distribution services and variable demand elasticity", 
by Ph. Jeanfils, Research series, August 2008. 
136. "Multivariate structural time series models with dual cycles: Implications for measurement of output gap 
and potential growth", by Ph. Moës, Research series, August 2008. 
137. "Agency problems in structured finance - A case study of European CLOs", by J. Keller, Document 
series, August 2008. 
138. "The efficiency frontier as a method for gauging the performance of public expenditure: A Belgian case 
study", by B. Eugène, Research series, September 2008. 
139. "Exporters and credit constraints. A firm-level approach", by M. Muûls, Research series, September 
2008. 
140. "Export destinations and learning-by-exporting: Evidence from Belgium", by M. Pisu, Research series, 
September 2008. 
141. "Monetary aggregates and liquidity in a neo-Wicksellian framework", by M.  Canzoneri, R.  Cumby, 
B. Diba and D. López-Salido, Research series, October 2008. 
142  "Liquidity, inflation and asset prices in a time-varying framework for the euro area, by Ch. Baumeister, 
E. Durinck and G. Peersman, Research series, October 2008. 
143. "The bond premium in a DSGE model with long-run real and nominal risks", by G. D. Rudebusch and 
E. T. Swanson, Research series, October 2008. 
144. "Imperfect information, macroeconomic dynamics and the yield curve: An encompassing macro-finance 
model", by H. Dewachter, Research series, October 2008. 
145. "Housing market spillovers: Evidence from an estimated DSGE model", by M. Iacoviello and S. Neri, 
Research series, October 2008. 
146. "Credit frictions and optimal monetary policy", by V. Cúrdia and M. Woodford, Research series, October 
2008. 
147. "Central Bank misperceptions and the role of money in interest rate rules", by G. Beck and V. Wieland, 
Research series, October 2008. 
148. "Financial (in)stability, supervision and liquidity injections: A dynamic general equilibrium approach", by 
G. de Walque, O. Pierrard and A. Rouabah, Research series, October 2008. 
149. "Monetary policy, asset prices and macroeconomic conditions: A panel-VAR study", by K. Assenmacher-
Wesche and S. Gerlach, Research series, October 2008. 
150. "Risk premiums and macroeconomic dynamics in a heterogeneous agent model", by F. De Graeve, 
M. Dossche, M. Emiris, H. Sneessens and R. Wouters, Research series, October 2008. 
151. "Financial factors in economic fluctuations", by L. J. Christiano, R. Motto and M. Rotagno, Research 
series, to be published. 
152. "Rent-sharing under different bargaining regimes: Evidence from linked employer-employee data", by 
M. Rusinek and F. Rycx, Research series, December 2008. 
153. "Forecast with judgment and models", by F. Monti, Research series, December 2008. 
154. "Institutional features of wage bargaining in 23 European countries, the US and Japan", by Ph. Du Caju, 
E. Gautier, D. Momferatou and M. Ward-Warmedinger, Research series, December 2008. 
155. "Fiscal sustainability and policy implications for the euro area", by F. Balassone, J. Cunha, G. Langenus, 
B. Manzke, J Pavot, D. Prammer and P. Tommasino, Research series, January 2009.   NBB WORKING PAPER No. 195 - SEPTEMBER 2010  52
156. "Understanding sectoral differences in downward real wage rigidity: Workforce composition, institutions, 
technology and competition", by Ph. Du Caju, C. Fuss and L. Wintr, Research series, February 2009. 
157. "Sequential bargaining in a New Keynesian model with frictional unemployment and staggered wage 
negotiation", by G. de Walque, O. Pierrard, H. Sneessens and R. Wouters, Research series, February 
2009. 
158. "Economic importance of air transport and airport activities in Belgium", by F. Kupfer and F. Lagneaux, 
Document series, March 2009. 
159. "Rigid labour compensation and flexible employment? Firm-Level evidence with regard to productivity for 
Belgium", by C. Fuss and L. Wintr, Research series, March 2009. 
160. "The Belgian iron and steel industry in the international context", by F. Lagneaux and D. Vivet, Document 
series, March 2009. 
161. "Trade, wages and productivity", by K. Behrens, G. Mion, Y. Murata and J. Südekum, Research series, 
March 2009. 
162. "Labour flows in Belgium", by P. Heuse and Y. Saks, Research series, April 2009. 
163. "The young Lamfalussy: An empirical and policy-oriented growth theorist", by I. Maes, Research series, 
April 2009. 
164. "Inflation dynamics with labour market matching: Assessing alternative specifications", by K. Christoffel, 
J. Costain, G. de Walque, K. Kuester, T. Linzert, S. Millard and O. Pierrard, Research series, May 2009. 
165. "Understanding inflation dynamics: Where do we stand?", by M. Dossche, Research series, June 2009. 
166. "Input-output connections between sectors and optimal monetary policy", by E. Kara, Research series, 
June 2009. 
167. "Back to the basics in banking? A micro-analysis of banking system stability", by O.  De Jonghe, 
Research series, June 2009. 
168.  "Model misspecification, learning and the exchange rate disconnect puzzle", by V.  Lewis and 
A. Markiewicz, Research series, July 2009. 
169. "The use of fixed-term contracts and the labour adjustment in Belgium", by E. Dhyne and B. Mahy, 
Research series, July 2009. 
170. "Analysis of business demography using markov chains – An application to Belgian data”, by F. Coppens 
and F. Verduyn, Research series, July 2009. 
171. "A global assessment of the degree of price stickiness - Results from the NBB business survey", by 
E. Dhyne, Research series, July 2009. 
172. "Economic importance of the Belgian ports: Flemish maritime ports, Liège port complex and the port of 
Brussels - Report 2007", by C. Mathys, Document series, July 2009. 
173. "Evaluating a monetary business cycle model with unemployment for the euro area", by N. Groshenny, 
Research series, July 2009. 
174. "How are firms' wages and prices linked: Survey evidence in Europe", by M. Druant, S. Fabiani and 
G. Kezdi, A. Lamo, F. Martins and R. Sabbatini, Research series, August 2009. 
175. "Micro-data on nominal rigidity, inflation persistence and optimal monetary policy", by E. Kara, Research 
series, September 2009. 
176. "On the origins of the BIS macro-prudential approach to financial stability: Alexandre Lamfalussy and 
financial fragility", by I. Maes, Research series, October 2009. 
177. "Incentives and tranche retention in securitisation: A screening model", by I. Fender and J. Mitchell, 
Research series, October 2009. 
178. "Optimal monetary policy and firm entry", by V. Lewis, Research series, October 2009. 
179. "Staying, dropping, or switching: The impacts of bank mergers on small firms", by H.  Degryse, 
N. Masschelein and J. Mitchell, Research series, October 2009. 
180. "Inter-industry wage differentials: How much does rent sharing matter?", by Ph. Du Caju, F. Rycx and 
I. Tojerow, Research series, October 2009. 
181. "Empirical evidence on the aggregate effects of anticipated and unanticipated US tax policy shocks", by 
K. Mertens and M. O. Ravn, Research series, November 2009. 
182. "Downward nominal and real wage rigidity: Survey evidence from European firms", by J.  Babecký, 
Ph. Du Caju, T. Kosma, M. Lawless, J. Messina and T. Rõõm, Research series, November 2009. 
183. "The margins of labour cost adjustment: Survey evidence from European firms", by J.  Babecký, 
Ph. Du Caju, T. Kosma, M. Lawless, J. Messina and T. Rõõm, Research series, November 2009.  
184. "Discriminatory fees, coordination and investment in shared ATM networks" by S. Ferrari, Research 
series, January 2010. 
185. "Self-fulfilling liquidity dry-ups", by F. Malherbe, Research series, March 2010. 
186. "The development of monetary policy in the 20th century - some reflections", by O. Issing, Research 
series, April 2010. NBB WORKING PAPER No. 195 - SEPTEMBER 2010    53 
187. "Getting rid of Keynes? A survey of the history of macroeconomics from Keynes to Lucas and beyond", 
by M. De Vroey, Research series, April 2010. 
188. "A century of macroeconomic and monetary thought at the National Bank of Belgium", by I. Maes, 
Research series, April 2010. 
189. "Inter-industry wage differentials in EU countries: What do cross-country time-varying data add to the 
picture?", by Ph. Du Caju, G. Kátay, A. Lamo, D. Nicolitsas and S. Poelhekke, Research series, 
April 2010. 
190. "What determines euro area bank CDS spreads?", by J. Annaert, M. De Ceuster, P.  Van Roy and 
C. Vespro, Research series, May 2010. 
191. "The incidence of nominal and real wage rigidity: An individual-based sectoral approach", by J. Messina, 
Ph. Du Caju, C. F. Duarte, N. L. Hansen, M. Izquierdo, Research series, June 2010. 
192. "Economic importance of the Belgian ports: Flemish maritime ports, Liège port complex and the port of 
Brussels - Report 2008", by C. Mathys, Document series, July 2010. 
193. "Wages, labor or prices: how do firms react to shocks?", by E. Dhyne and M. Druant, Research series, 
July 2010. 
194.  "Trade with China and skill upgrading: Evidence from Belgian firm level data", by G. Mion, 
 H. Vandenbussche, and L. Zhu, Research series, September 2010. 
195.  "Trade crisis? What trade crisis?", by K. Behrens, G. Corcos and G. Mion, Research series, 
September 2010. 
 
 © Illustrations :   gettyimages – PhotoDisc 
National Bank of Belgium
Layout : Analysis and Research Group 
Cover : NBB TS – Prepress & Image
Published in September 2010
Editor
Jan Smets
Member of the board of Directors of the National Bank of Belgium
National Bank of Belgium 
Limited liability company 
RLP Brussels – Company’s number : 0203.201.340 
Registered office : boulevard de Berlaimont 14 – BE -1000 Brussels 
www.nbb.be 